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INTRODUCTION
During the first months of 2018, two short pieces on legal education
were published. One reported on the results of a survey of college
graduates, law school graduates, and holders of other advanced degrees.1
The study found that today’s post-law graduates were less likely than
their pre-recession counterparts to report that the J.D. degree was worth
the cost and more likely to have second thoughts about their decision to
go to law school.2 The findings prompted Aaron Taylor, executive
director of the Access Lex Center for Legal Education Excellence, to
conclude that there are “two distinct worlds of law graduates” made up
of “[t]he ones who graduated during and after the recession [that began
in 2008]. Those in the former group paid less for their degrees and they
had an easier time finding good employment. The latter group paid more
and had a harder time finding good employment.”3

1. See Karen Sloan, Law Grads Have Grown Skeptical of a JD’s Value, LAW.COM (Jan.
17, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2018/01/16/law-grads-have-grownskeptical-of-a-jds-value/.
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id.
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The second piece was an open letter to Harvard law students from
alumnus Ralph Nader.4 In his letter, Nader decried his alma mater’s
failure to recognize the obligations of public service that come with
being part of a learned profession.5 He urged students to become aware
of “the distinction between charity and justice.”6 As he explained,
“charitable work by lawyers is about immediate assistance, while
advancing justice is structural work that foresees and forestalls the
conditions that give rise to the ever-growing need for charity.”7 He
exhorted students not to “trivialize your estimable talents for lucrative
returns” because “[k]eeping your conscience at home while selling your
talents is a very high price to pay during the fifty years or so you will
practice law.”8 He recommended that students be broadly curious and
“passionately attach [themselves] to some mission for more structural
justice.”9
A reader unfamiliar with the field of law could not be faulted for
wondering whether these two pieces, published almost
contemporaneously, are referring to the same profession. While one
emphasizes whether a career in law is a satisfactory financial
proposition, the other focuses on the duties of lawyers to advance the
greater good. This Article asks how such utterly distinct images of the
legal profession and legal education have come to exist side by side and
how this ongoing juxtaposition poses special challenges for law and
leadership. These parallel accounts of professionalism have deep roots
in the historical evolution of modern American lawyering. The
organized bar has embraced a model of “social trustee
professionalism,”10 which treats law as a learned profession with publicregarding obligations. As social trustees, attorneys are to use their

4. See Ralph Nader, An Open Letter to Harvard Law Students, THE HARVARD LAW
RECORD (Feb. 12, 2018), http://hlrecord.org/2018/02/an-open-letter-to-harvard-lawstudents/.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
10. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS 36 (1994). In scholarship on legal ethics,
social trustee professionalism maps onto a “public interest” model of professional
responsibility in which an attorney owes duties to the court and to innocent third parties as
well as to clients. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 8 (1998). For a skeptical
view of this model and the ethical norms it establishes, see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the
ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 653, 668 (1981) (social trusteeship is
more rhetorical than real and primarily serves to legitimate the profession’s market control)
[hereinafter Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?]; Norman W. Spaulding,
The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1397, 1400-09, 1447 (2003) (questioning whether morally activist,
civic republican lawyering ever enjoyed a dominant place in the American legal profession).
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complex knowledge and skills to serve both individual clients and the
greater good.11 Attorneys become “double agents”12 in ways that
potentially pit the private and self-regarding interests of clients against a
more selfless and public-regarding concern for collective welfare. The
precise parameters of that trade-off have never been entirely clear. At
times, the greater good has been equated with protecting the justice
system by upholding norms of formal neutrality and impartiality and
rejecting a “win-at-all-costs” mentality.13 Yet, regard for the public
welfare can have broader implications: Lawyers may aspire to advance
social justice in ways that blur the line between law and politics.14
Striking the right balance between private interests and public values has
undoubtedly been difficult—if not impossible—to achieve. Given these
difficulties, some attorneys have turned away from social trusteeship
altogether to embrace expert professionalism, which defines a mastery
of knowledge and skills as the sole basis for status and respect. 15 This
market-based approach treats expertise as a private commodity to be
bought and sold. Far from being a double agent, then, a lawyer’s only
obligation is to advance a client’s objectives—at a price.16
To understand the ongoing and unresolved status of these
competing concepts of professionalism, it is useful to trace how lawyers’
identities evolved during three prior ages of modern American
lawyering. The first age emerged in response to industrialization and
urbanization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. With
the rise of large corporations, a new breed of lawyer emerged to serve
the business community, most notably in the urban centers of New York
and Chicago. To temper an image of attorneys as nothing but the tools
of wealthy industrial clients, corporate lawyers assumed leading roles in

11. BRINT, supra note 10, at 36-37; RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 16 (1989)
[hereinafter ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS].
12. Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS 53 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed.,
1984). See also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955 (2000) (“The dual role of [safeguarding the
justice system and distributing goods through private commercial markets] causes internal
conflict in the profession.”).
13. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 2-4, 67-68, 81-82 (2d ed. 2005).
14. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism,
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 490-92 (1985) [hereinafter Abel, Law Without Politics].
15. BRINT, supra note 10, at 8-9. In legal ethics scholarship, expert professionalism
maps onto an “agency loyalty” model in which the lawyer’s sole duty is one of fidelity to the
client’s interests. The lawyer must refrain from evaluating the legitimacy or wisdom (as
opposed to legality) of their desire. SIMON, supra note 10, at 7; Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613.
16. BRINT, supra note 10, at 40-41.
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the organized bar and embraced social trustee professionalism to
highlight their public-spiritedness. Social trusteeship was used to justify
new ethical constraints on commercial practices like advertising and
“ambulance chasing” that might confuse law practice with a profitseeking trade.17 At the same time, bar leaders pushed for high standards
of admission to practice to make clear that law was an intellectual
enterprise distinct from both the world of business and the rough-andtumble of politics. As a result, law schools played a pivotal part in
elaborating social trustee professionalism, even as they began to
emphasize the knowledge and skills at the core of expert
professionalism.18
The second age of modern American lawyering accompanied the
rise of the New Deal. The nation’s economic collapse during the Great
Depression left many Americans impoverished and doubtful that the free
market would protect ordinary people against the depredations of
capitalism. 19 With courts perceived as obstructing reform on formalist
grounds, New Deal attorneys invoked the power of the political branches
to deploy law in the service of the general good. The upshot was the rise
of government lawyers, who specialized in administrative law and
regulatory practice. In implementing New Deal reforms, these lawyers
challenged the prerogatives of the corporate bar and ultimately created
their own power base.20 Despite the profound shift in lawyering, bar
leaders did not make far-reaching changes to standards of professional
conduct in response to this emerging form of practice.21 Nor did law
schools alter their curricula in fundamental ways to prepare students for
new responsibilities. Faced with a normative void, government lawyers
justified their newfound authority on grounds of expertise, much as
economists or other technical experts in the New Deal’s brain trust did.
This sharp turn to expert professionalism contradicted the tradition of
social trusteeship, but any nascent conflict was deflected by treating
government lawyers as inherently public-minded because they served an
amorphous client known as “the people.” 22
The third age of modern American lawyering came about during
the campaign to promote civil rights, initially for blacks and later for

17. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 42-43 (1976).
18. See infra notes 75-81.
19. See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 162-63 (1995).
20. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
21. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 10, at 644 (ethical
rules do not address “the distinctive situation of the lawyer employed by business or
government”).
22. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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other marginalized groups.23 The success of the civil rights movement
led to the rise of cause lawyering,24 which cast attorneys’ obligation to
promote the general welfare in a fresh light. Cause lawyers moved well
beyond protecting the integrity of the legal and judicial process by
emphasizing structural reforms that required political intervention.25
But, in contrast to government lawyers, these attorneys did so as
outsiders who challenged conventional uses of power and authority.
Even as cause lawyers tested the boundaries of social trustee
professionalism, they rejected the narrowness of expert
professionalism.26 In their view, lawyers were not mere instruments of
clients’ desires but instead had to work collaboratively with clients and
communities to identify and implement reform.27 Ironically, though,
cause lawyering sowed the seeds of an intensified commitment to
market-based expert professionalism. Cause lawyers successfully
challenged ethical prohibitions on advertising and solicitation, which in
turn unleashed newfound competitiveness for clients and revenues
among attorneys.28 Cause lawyering raised profound questions about
professionalism, but the organized bar and legal educators left most of
these questions unanswered, further complicating the uneasy
relationship between social trustee and expert professionalism.
Understanding the three ages of modern American lawyering can
help us to contemplate whether there is currently a crisis in the legal
profession and legal education, whether that crisis is leading us to a
fourth age of lawyering, and how best to approach this momentous
23. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 117-37 (1977) for the early origins of this
movement.
24. The term “cause lawyering” is itself a subject of debate and vies with other terms like
“social justice lawyering,” “public interest lawyering,” “rebellious lawyering,” and
“lawyering for social change.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering:
Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in
CAUSE LAWYERING 31, 33 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998).
25. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998)
[hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority].
26. Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING
128 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998).
27. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority, supra note 25, at 3-4; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE xxv (1988); Gary
Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 297, 300, 302-04 (1996).
28. See, e.g., JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS 7175, 79-88 (2013); see STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE
IN 9, 23-24 (2004) [hereinafter SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN]; Scott
Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2004); Sarat & Scheingold,
Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority, supra note 25, at 3-4; John
Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 24, at 181, 183-86.
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question. Much of the current sense of crisis stems from the
restructuring of the market for expertise.29 These changes lie behind
Aaron Taylor’s conclusion that pre- and post-recession law graduates
inhabit different worlds. Some commentators have gone even farther.
For them, market restructuring seems so profound that it calls into
question the ongoing relevance of professionalism, a shift that would
surely augur a marked departure from earlier ages of modern American
lawyering.30 Market restructuring also has posed new questions about
whether social trustee professionalism will be displaced in the rush for
revenue, often with a focus on large law firm attorneys, as Ralph Nader’s
open letter makes clear.31 This growing emphasis on the bottom line has
left many law students and lawyers, even public interest lawyers,
wondering whether a dedication to the greater good is a personal rather
than professional commitment.32 The notion that being a lawyer is
divorced from any larger social obligations again would represent a
notable shift from earlier ages of American lawyering.
To address these challenges, bar leaders and legal educators must
carefully evaluate how market forces are reshaping expert
professionalism to determine whether social trustee professionalism
eventually will be crowded out or whether professionalism itself will
cease to be a useful tool for understanding lawyers’ identities. That
assessment will need to take place not just in large law firms but in solo
practices, small and mid-sized firms, public interest organizations, and
government agencies. Efforts to study professionalism should go
beyond an analysis of technical knowledge to identify a broad portfolio
of skills that predict success in law practice. Moreover, there should be
a recognition that the meaning of social trusteeship can differ across
practice sectors, especially when comparing law firms to government
agencies and public interest organizations. Ideally, these inquiries will
offer a more nuanced picture of the ways in which lawyers understand
29. For descriptions of the current sense of crisis, see, e.g., B ENJAMIN BARTON, GLASS
HALF FULL 55-103, 121-29 (2015); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 71-84,
107-66 (2012). But cf. Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal
Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and
Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 504-05, 506-09 (2013) (a sense of crisis is
a recurring feature of the legal profession and legal education); Richard L. Abel, “You Never
Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste.” Reflections on the Reform of Legal Education in the
U.S., UK, and Australia, 22 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 3, 3-4, 5, 16 (2015) [hereinafter Abel, You
Never Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste].
30. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 71-128 (2010); Russell
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1246-69 (1995).
31. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Marc Galanter, The Elastic Tournament: The
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1906-1913 (2008).
32. See John Bliss, Divided Selves: Professional Role Distancing Among Law Students
and New Lawyers in a Period of Market Crisis, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855, 890 (2017).
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their work and allow law schools to prepare students to navigate their
own careers effectively.
I. THE FIRST AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE OF
CORPORATE LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL
Before turning to the first age of modern American lawyering, it is
worth observing that law’s status as a profession is of ancient vintage.
Law, along with medicine and theology, was one of three original
professions that emerged in England in the late medieval period.33
Professionals catered to the needs of the landed gentry: Doctors would
attend to the mortal flesh, lawyers to the material wealth, and ministers
to the eternal soul of the most privileged members of society.34 The
success of this arrangement turned on the trust that professionals
engendered by acquiring the gentlemanly characteristics of their
clients.35 The elite nature of the legal profession was exported to the
American colonies, where a system of apprenticeships preserved
exclusivity through closed social networks.36 During the early years of
the republic, the typical lawyer practiced alone or in a small firm and
often held other jobs simultaneously.37 With law in a fairly rudimentary
state, technical expertise at times was secondary to “forensic bravura” in
cementing a lawyer’s reputation.38
Like their English counterparts, American lawyers served an elite
clientele but distinguished themselves by using these intimate
associations to assume a leading role in the nation-building process—so
much so that in the 1830s, Alexander de Tocqueville dubbed attorneys
America’s aristocracy.39
The gentleman-lawyer’s conspicuously
advantaged status ultimately triggered a populist backlash that lasted
from the late 1820s through the early 1850s. Reacting to fears that the
legal profession was indifferent to the common people, Jacksonian
democrats eliminated barriers to law practice as a way to diminish

33. BRINT, supra note 10, at 26-27; Robin Middlehurst & Tom Kennie, Leading
Professionals: Toward New Concepts of Professionalism, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?
50-51 (Jane Broadbent et al. eds. 1997).
34. BRINT, supra note 10, at 27.
35. Id. at 27-28; Jane Broadbent, Michael Dietrich, and Jennifer Roberts, The End of the
Professions?, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?, supra note 33, at 3.
36. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 10-13 (1977); BRINT,
supra note 10, at 8.
37. BARTON, supra note 29, at 20-21; ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 27-28 (1965).
38. LARSON, supra note 36, at 125-26; CHROUST, supra note 37, at 27.
39. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281-90 (1945); LARSON, supra
note 36, at 111, 168-69.
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practitioners’ perceived privilege. These changes did little to unsettle
the prerogatives of gentlemen-lawyers but devastated the fledgling bar.40
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the rise of industrialization
and urbanization coincided with concentrated wealth; indeed, this era
was dubbed the Gilded Age.41 With economic restructuring, a new kind
of client emerged: the large American corporation. Corporate clients
sought advice on novel and complex business questions, and leading
lawyers formed firms in the urban centers of New York and Chicago to
accommodate these demands.42 Due to the broad range of knowledge
required to serve a corporate client’s needs, firms grew larger and
developed specialty practices.43 Corporate attorneys counseled clients
on major transactions and kept them out of lawsuits. Technical expertise
and prudent judgment, rather than dramatic courtroom flair, became the
key to success.44
A. The Innovation of Social Trustee Professionalism: The Organized
Bar’s Push for Ethical Canons and Educational Reform
The power and prominence of the corporate bar gave birth to the
first age of modern American lawyering and the innovation of social
trustee professionalism. Close relationships between corporate lawyers
and business leaders led to renewed skepticism about the legal
profession’s sensitivity to the needs of everyday people, a painful
reminder of the Jacksonian era.45
A model of social trustee
professionalism offered an attractive solution by anchoring lawyers’
authority and status not just in demonstrated mastery of specialized
knowledge and skills but also in an obligation to serve the greater good.46
By treating law as a calling rather than an ordinary occupation, social
40. LARSON, supra note 36, at 104, 124-25, 145; Robert W. Gordon, Professors and
Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE
LAW SCHOOL 75, 78 (Anthony T. Kronman ed. 2004).
41. SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE (3d ed. 1993).
42. LARSON, supra note 36, at 170. Interestingly, descriptions of lawyers as “natural
aristocrats” persisted, but this time their status was linked to the fact that they would “not . . .
litigate but . . . [would] work with businessmen, especially in Wall Street.” ROBERT STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL 23 (1983) (quoting Benjamin Silliman, Commencement Address at Columbia
Law School (1867)). This shift would be reflected in innovations in legal education. For
those who embraced Langdell’s vision of legal science, the lawyer-statesmen of an earlier era
were dismissed as “oratorical windbags.” Gordon, supra note 40, at 79.
43. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 8 (1988); John P. Heinz, Robert L.
Nelson, & Edward O. Laumann, The Scale of Justice: Observations on the Transformation of
Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 337, 338-39, 342-46 (2001).
44. LARSON, supra note 36, at 170.
45. Id.; see also MICHAEL POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE 9-11
(1988); BRINT, supra note 10, at 33 (cleavages between corporate lawyers and other attorneys
hampered solidarity in the profession).
46. BRINT, supra note 10, at 36-37; LARSON, supra note 36, at 28.
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trustee professionalism distinguished lawyers from tradesmen motivated
by wages as well as entrepreneurs motivated by profits.47 The esoteric
nature of legal expertise coupled with a public-spirited commitment to
service enabled the bar to justify special treatment for its members, most
notably self-regulation and monopoly privileges.48
Insofar as public-regarding claims remained largely rhetorical,
there was a risk that lawyers would be unmasked as mere hired guns who
used their expertise to single-mindedly advance clients’ interests. The
bar hit upon a strategy that would demonstrate its authentic regard for
the public while advancing some interests of its own. This strategy
turned on highlighting the need for quality control in the profession to
protect society from unfit practitioners. Elite members of the organized
bar were alarmed that immigrant and Jewish lawyers had been entering
the profession in unprecedented numbers.49 Bar leaders feared that these
newcomers would lower the esteem in which the profession was held—
because of both their social origins and the cases they would bring.
Struggling to find a niche in urban legal markets, foreign-born and
Jewish attorneys often represented the poor and working class in
disputes over wages, industrial accidents, and labor practices.50
Corporate attorneys quickly concluded that with clients like these, the
arriviste lawyers were no gentlemen.51 Still, given that Jacksonian
reforms had devastated the organized bar only a few decades before,
powerful practitioners had to appear principled and public-minded even
as they sought to thwart the influx of new attorneys.52
Founded in 1878,53 the American Bar Association (ABA) addressed
the difficulty in two ways, both designed to preserve elite prerogatives.
First, in 1908, the ABA adopted a Canon of Ethics, which states quickly

47. LARSON, supra note 36, at 61.
48. Id. at 12, 14-15, 46, 48, 52-54, 222-23; JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950); BRINT, supra note 10, at 34, 67, 69; Broadbent et al., supra note
35, at 22-23; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2583-84 (1999).
49. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 40-41; Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law
Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-22, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551, 574-75,
578-80, 584-86 (1971) [hereinafter Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and
Practitioners].
50. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 40-41; LARSON, supra note 36, at 173.
51. LARSON, supra note 36, at 173-74; AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 50-52; Auerbach,
Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, supra note 49, at 585-86.
52. LARSON, supra note 36, at 119 (noting the distrust of lawyers as agents of the wealthy
during the period of Jacksonian democracy); Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an
Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 349-50, 355 (2008); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a
Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 994, 996-98 (2003).
53. LARSON, supra note 36, at 170. Several urban bars were created before the ABA was
established to be a national voice for the profession. Id. at 170-71.
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adopted.54 In response to anxieties about the commercialization of law
practice, the Canon prohibited advertising and aggressive solicitation of
clients and subjected contingent fees to special scrutiny.55 The
provisions effectively codified a vision of practice based on “a small
homogeneous community whose members enjoyed shared values, ease
of communication, and a network of mutually reinforcing educational,
religious, and social ties.”56 This approach worked well for attorneys in
small towns as well as for the tight-knit, upper-class bar in large cities.
However, the strictures hampered urban lawyers who served poor,
immigrant, and working-class clients unfamiliar with how to obtain legal
assistance.57 As historian Jerold Auerbach notes, the ABA’s ethical code
“consigned the lawyer to his office to await a client who wandered by
with a case that assured fame and fortune, and attributed success (hardly
unrelated in American society to material accumulation) to good
character.”58 The upshot was that “[a]mbulance chasers became the
scapegoats in a heterogeneous profession increasingly populated by
foreign-born lawyers.”59
A similar dynamic arose at the local level. In New York City, for
instance, patrician elites founded the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York (ABCNY), an organization so exclusive that it represented
only about ten percent of the profession one year after its founding in
1870.60 This allowed the “best men” of the bar to distance themselves
from the undeserving and uncouth who treated law like a trade.61
Membership was so restricted that nearly forty years later, in 1908, the
New York County Lawyers Association was founded to represent the
profession as a whole.62 Though its membership grew rapidly, it did not
challenge the ABCNY’s dominant position, which was grounded in the
power and influence of its privileged members.63
To preserve the corporate bar’s prerogatives, the ABA took a
second and perhaps even more momentous step: increasing the
educational requirements for admission to practice. The campaign to
raise standards reflected longstanding resistance to “[t]he idea that law

54. MORGAN, supra note 30, at 45-46; AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 42.
55. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 43-48.
56. Id. at 42. According to historian Lincoln Caplan, the code also was a response to
scandals related to the railroad industry in which lawyers participated in bribery of legislators
and improper influence of judges. LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN 124-25 (1993).
57. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 42-44.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. at 48.
60. POWELL, supra note 45, at 15.
61. Id. at 14-15.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id. at 28-29, 32.
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was a trade to be learned like any other.”64 Bar leaders believed that
shifting from unregulated apprenticeships to standardized formal
training would distinguish law as a calling. At the same time, a common
educational experience could weed out the unworthy and unify an
otherwise fragmented profession.65 Beginning in the late 1800s, ABA
officials endorsed the superiority of law school training, and in 1900,
these efforts spawned the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS), an organization of academics dedicated to promoting the
interests of “reputable” schools.66 The AALS initially was formed
because of law faculty’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform in
legal education, but the ABA and the AALS eventually forged a close
working partnership.67 Their joint efforts to elevate standards at first met
with little success.68 Instead, the number of lawyers continued to grow,
and law schools of all kinds proliferated.69
Bar leaders felt especially aggrieved by these setbacks because of
the rapid progress the medical profession had made in controlling
practitioner quality through enhanced educational requirements.70 In
1904, the American Medical Association founded the Council on
Medical Education, which obtained Carnegie Foundation support for a
comprehensive study done under the direction of educator Abraham
Flexner.71 The Flexner report, published in 1910, prompted states to
impose higher admissions standards for medical schools and to require
“scientific” instruction by qualified faculty in suitable medical
facilities.72 These mandates succeeded in driving out marginal
institutions, particularly part-time and night medical schools.73 The
thoroughgoing transformation of medical education was “galling” to
ABA leaders who had long worried about the deleterious effects of
proprietary law schools with part-time programs of questionable
quality.74

64. STEVENS, supra note 42, at xv. These efforts were supported by local bar
associations, such as the ABCNY. POWELL, supra note 45, at 36.
65. See STEVENS, supra note 42, at xv-xvi.
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id. at 96-97, 112.
68. LARSON, supra note 36, at 173; STEVENS, supra note 42, at 27-28, 93-99.
69. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 74-81.
70. Id. at 112.
71. Id. at 102.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 102-03.
74. Id.
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B. Analytical Legal Education, Expert Professionalism, and the
“Harvardization” of Law Schools
Flexner triumphed by arguing that “formal analytical reasoning, the
kind of thinking integral to the natural sciences, should enjoy pride of
place in the intellectual training of physicians.”75 Thanks to Christopher
Columbus Langdell, dean of the Harvard Law School, the bar was able
to make similar arguments about legal education, tacitly drawing on a
paradigm that prized technical expertise over other professional virtues.
In the late 1800s, Langdell pioneered a number of reforms based on a
model of scientific inquiry, which he called the case method.76 This
method allowed students to discover legal principles by treating
appellate cases as data points that led to inferences about doctrinal
rules.77 Students could master these techniques through Socratic
instruction that forced them to extract underlying legal principles from
carefully curated decisions.78 The “Harvardization”79 of the law school
curriculum justified heightened admissions criteria so that students
would have the intellectual capacity necessary to master this complex
method.80 Like Flexner’s approach to medicine, Langdell’s account of
law linked the profession to “a unitary, self-contained, value-free, and
consistent set of principles.”81 Langdell believed that young faculty,
untainted by lengthy experience in practice, would absorb the method,
transmit it to students, and develop an independent voice to counter the
bar’s conventional thinking.82
Langdell’s emphasis on the science of law often has been equated
with a desire for academic respectability and an aversion to identification
as a trade school.83 But there is likely more to the story than that.
Though rooted in the bar’s efforts to promote social trustee
professionalism, the embrace of scientific methods of instruction planted
the seeds of expert professionalism by sidelining efforts to develop the
meaning of public obligation. While elaborating the case method,
Langdell and his disciples studiously avoided matters of public law
75. Molly Cooke, David M. Irby, William Sullivan, & Kenneth M. Ludmerer, American
Medical Education 100 Years after the Flexner Report, 355 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1339 (2006).
76. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 52-53.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 52-53; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS 4-7 (2007);
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 26 (2007); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Taking Law and ___ Really Seriously: Before, During and After “The Law,” 60 VAND. L.
REV. 555, 560-63 (2007).
79. Gordon, supra note 40, at 80.
80. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1973-75 (2012).
81. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 53.
82. Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 40-41.
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despite the nascent growth of legislation and regulation. That artful
maneuver was motivated in part by market considerations. Schools that
taught law as statecraft repeatedly failed, while those that focused on
private practice thrived.84 A value-neutral science also was an appealing
way to deflect the aftermath of recent ruptures that had rocked Harvard
Law School and strained its bonds of collegiality. There were, for
example, profound disagreements about slavery in the 1850s, federal
authority over the South in the postbellum era, and the rise of large-scale
capitalist enterprises at the turn of the century.85 Professors elsewhere
on campus had been dismissed when they took positions on these issues
that offended conservative trustees of the Harvard Corporation.86 As
legal historian Robert W. Gordon observes, “[a] law dean trying to sell
the practical virtues of a theoretical training to a skeptical and
conservative bar might well want to avoid the swamp of interdisciplinary
work and the third rail of public law and policy issues.”87
The case method consolidated a narrow notion of obligation, one
that focused on law as a self-contained, largely private universe in which
attorneys fulfilled their public responsibilities by assisting courts in
administering justice and developing doctrine. Between 1870 and 1920,
Harvard’s instructional approach became so dominant that some feared
it was an “educational octopus.”88 In fact, Harvard’s wide reach
normalized and legitimated uniform instructional standards that
entrenched the case method and thus limited efforts to develop the
meaning of public obligation elsewhere, for example, at part-time and
night schools that served immigrant lawyers who became active in
politics.89 As the educational octopus spread, the ABA successfully
sought funding from the Carnegie Foundation for two studies to evaluate
legal education.90 The first of these, the Redlich report, was published
in 1914 and addressed ongoing controversy about whether all law
84. Gordon, supra note 40, at 79.
85. Id. at 79-80.
86. Id. at 80.
87. Id.
88. GLEASON L. ARCHER, THE EDUCATIONAL OCTOPUS 275-78 (1915). Gleason
Archer was the dean of Suffolk, a proprietary law school in Boston, who vigorously opposed
efforts to force all institutions to conform to an academic model of legal education. STEVENS,
supra note 42, at 175-76.
89. See STEVENS, supra note 42, at 41-42. Elevated standards came at a price. Initially,
the cost of legal training at Harvard was comparable to that of the most expensive
apprenticeships. From 1869 to 1879, however, the expense rose by 450 percent as academic
law schools enhanced their reputation and reach. DANIEL K. COQUILLETTE AND BRUCE A.
KIMBALL, ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF MERIT 51, 413-14 (2015). The fees at national law
schools also came to be substantially higher than those at night schools that served working
men in urban areas. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, supra
note 49, at 577.
90. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 112.
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schools should be Harvardized.91 The Carnegie Corporation chose Josef
Redlich, a law professor from the University of Vienna, to serve as a
neutral arbiter among the warring factions.92
Redlich, an outsider steeped in the civil law traditions of his home
country, endorsed the case method with some reservations.93 He
acknowledged its advantages as a tool for practical training of lawyers.
Unlike classroom lectures, the Socratic method engaged students and
forced them to think for themselves.94 However, Redlich rejected some
of the method’s scientific pretensions. In his view, forcing students to
grapple with cases was just a more refined version of an apprenticeship,
which also used judicial decisions as raw material but in a far less
structured way.95 Moreover, Redlich questioned the theoretical
foundations of the case method as a form of natural science. In his view,
law was “a normative science (Normwissenschaft)” that “does not work
. . . with physical facts, but with the products of the human will, which
has been directed to the ordering and guidance of the individual and
social life of humanity.”96 Precisely because law was a set of “definite
norms, willed by men, and intended to guide and limit the business of
men,”97 Redlich called on law professors to systematize and reform
doctrine rather than serve as “industrious commentator[s]” who merely
described it.98 His report, while affirming the worth of the case method,
prodded legal educators to acknowledge the potentially far-reaching
implications of social trustee professionalism, implications that
Langdellian formalism had elegantly elided.
The second Carnegie-funded report by Alfred Z. Reed was
published in 1921 and raised new questions about the ABA’s vision for
legal education.99 Reed, a non-lawyer member of the Carnegie staff, was
another outsider to the profession.100 By design, his study amplified
Redlich’s, which had been based on observations of just ten of the over
91. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS (1914).
92. JAMES R. MAXEINER, EDUCATING LAWYERS NOW AND THEN, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL
INFO. 1, 7 (2007).
93. Redlich himself noted “the extraordinary difficulties” that arose because of “the
complete dissimilarity between the law of England and America and that of continental
Europe.” REDLICH, supra note 91, at 3. Indeed, the Carnegie Corporation’s choice of Redlich
may have been motivated by a desire to promote a model of German model of higher
education in American law schools. Id. at 8-9.
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id. at 37-40, 58. Redlich suggested curricular reforms that would make law school
training even more comprehensive than apprenticeships. Id. at 41-47.
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 62-65.
99. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921).
100. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 112.
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120 schools then in operation. All ten were elite institutions that mainly
relied on the case method.101 Redlich had recognized stratification in
legal education,102 but Reed made it a centerpiece of his evaluation.
Reed acknowledged the relevance of social trustee professionalism by
noting not only law’s private aspects but also its role as “part of the
governing mechanism of the state,” which made it “in a broad sense
political.”103 With lawyers performing a wide variety of tasks in the
public and private domain, Reed found the notion of a unified bar
inherently implausible. He called for different types of law schools to
prepare students for distinct sectors of practice.104 Reed’s conclusions
were anathema to bar leaders and legal educators seeking to standardize
law schools and consolidate the profession’s standing. The ABA,
working closely with the AALS, responded that same year with the Root
report, which asserted that: “In spite of the diversity of human relations
with respect to which the work of lawyers is done, the intellectual
requisites are in all cases substantially the same . . . . All require high
moral character and substantially the same intellectual preparation.”105
Despite some unexpected findings in the two Carnegie reports, the
ABA and AALS ultimately prevailed in implementing most of their
reform agenda. After World War I, the organized bar enjoyed newfound
respect because of legal services rendered to veterans and others in need
during the conflict.106 Buoyed by this goodwill, the ABA finally began
to make progress in its push for elevated standards. Formal training at
academic law schools became increasingly uniform and largely
displaced apprenticeships.107 Though proprietary law schools and parttime night programs survived, they were modeled on elite academic law
schools.108 Efforts to raise standards culminated in today’s system of
law school accreditation, which promotes a unified vision of preparation
for law practice by asking all law schools to demonstrate the
qualifications of students and faculty, the rigor of the curriculum, the
soundness of facilities, and the adequacy of library resources.109
101. Id. at 112-13.
102. REDLICH, supra note 91, at 70.
103. REED, supra note 99, at 3.
104. Id. at 417-18.
105. Elihu Root, Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 671, 681 (1921).
106. LARSON, supra note 36, at 174.
107. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 10.
108. U.S. News & World Report ranked nearly 80 part-time law school programs in the
United States in 2016. Best Grad Schools—Law, Part-Time Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(2016), at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/toplaw-schools/part-time-law-rankings/.
109. See Standards 301(a), 401, 501-503, 601-606, 701-702, ABA Standards and Rules of
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2015-16, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
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C. Legal Aid Societies and the Limited Vision of Social Trustee
Professionalism
Even as the Harvardization of law schools promoted uniformity in
instruction and restricted access to legal training, the limits of the bar’s
vision for social trustee professionalism were revealed through the
ongoing failure to meet the legal needs of burgeoning poor and
immigrant populations in urban areas. The German Society of New
York founded the first legal aid society in 1876 out of concern for the
fate of a growing number of immigrants from the homeland.110
Eventually, the society broadened its mission to serve all needy clients
in the city, but by the end of the nineteenth century, only two other cities,
Chicago and Jersey City, had launched similar initiatives.111 None of
these early societies were started by bar associations, despite lofty
rhetoric about preserving the integrity of the justice system for all.112 In
the early 1900s, local bars began to establish some legal aid programs,
and a handful of law schools opened clinics to serve the poor.113 The
first such clinic, launched at the University of Denver Law School, was
designed to provide practical training; by contrast, the student-initiated
and student-run Harvard Legal Aid Bureau was a response to the dire
legal needs of Boston’s poor.114
These local efforts did not garner national attention until Reginald
Heber Smith received funding from the Carnegie Foundation to study
legal aid societies, which in turn led to publication of his pathbreaking
book on Justice and the Poor.115 Smith, a Harvard Law School graduate
from a well-to-do family, eventually worked with leading lawyer and
former Supreme Court Justice Charles Evan Hughes to advance the
cause of legal aid around the country.116 These efforts relied entirely on
private philanthropy and met with only modest success. Indeed, with a
need to cultivate wealthy benefactors and to temper hostility from the
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR. The AALS imposes additional requirements on its member schools,
related to research and core values like diversity and non-discrimination. Association of
American Law Schools 2016 Handbook, art. 6, § 6-1, AALS (2016). Various commentators
have questioned the homogeneity required by the accreditation standards. See, e.g.,
TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 26-27, 31; STEVENS, supra note 42, at 209-10; George B.
Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal
Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2133-34, 2249-57 (1998); Spencer, supra note 80, at
2000-01; David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.’s Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2011.
110. EARL JOHNSON, JR., 1 TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL 3-7 (2014).
111. Id. at 7-18.
112. Id. at 18.
113. Id. at 19-20.
114. Id.
115. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JR., JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919); JOHNSON, supra note
110, at 21-22.
116. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 22-25.
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organized bar, the societies shied away from challenging substantial
corporate interests that might harm the poor.117 Private efforts never
produced enough attorneys to satisfy demand among the needy. Even in
1962, over forty years after Smith’s book was published, there were still
“the equivalent of only 400 full-time legal aid lawyers . . . to represent
over thirty-seven million low-income people . . . .”118 One significant
stumbling block was “the failure of local bar associations to give
leadership, and in many cases the hostility of lawyers to the idea,” which
in turn was attributed to “unfounded fear of competition, inherent
lethargy, or mere lack of interest.”119 The thinly realized rhetoric of
social trusteeship was no match for concerns about the dynamics of the
legal marketplace, which depended on generating revenue through client
service.
The failures of legal aid were only the most glaring example of the
limits of social trustee professionalism. At every turn, the rhetoric of
public-regarding obligation met the reality of the market for legal
services. Indeed, the very notion of social trusteeship was born of the
need to soften the implications of a new kind of elite expertise, the
technical know-how to serve large corporate interests. The ethical
canons, aimed at lawyers who served the less fortunate, hardly touched
the sheltered preserve in which a small cadre of influential lawyers
served a similarly small enclave of wealthy clients. These powerful
interests could not be offended through activist interpretations of the
public good. And, so social trusteeship was equated with tending to the
integrity of the administration of justice. This focus on process
reinforced the commitment to the formal neutrality of legal principles.
The Harvardization of legal education was driven by similar dynamics.
Students wanted practical skills, and conservative university trustees
wanted to avoid high-profile controversies about public values. Taken
together, the legal profession and legal education offered a rather
crimped understanding of social trustee professionalism that would be
challenged during the next age of modern American lawyering. The
focus on preserving the integrity of courts and preparing students to
grapple with judge-made law left the profession ill-prepared for the rise
of the administrative state and the arrival of a new breed of government
lawyer.

117. Id. at 39-40. Structural reforms in fact were part of the vision set forth in Reginald
Heber Smith’s seminal book on legal aid. SMITH, supra note 115, at 200-09. For an in-depth
description of these dynamics in Boston, Chicago, and New York, see Mark Spiegel, Legal
Aid 1900 to 1930: What Happened to Law Reform?, 8 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 199 (2015).
118. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 38.
119. EMERY BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1951).
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II. THE SECOND AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE ASSAULT ON LANGDELLIAN
FORMALISM
The second age of modern American lawyering arose in response
to the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state. Even before
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began pursuing bold reforms in the
late 1930s and early 1940s, a progressive movement had arisen that
deployed law as a tool for social change. Reflecting the newfound
independence that Langdell had hoped for, law professors questioned a
court-centered, scientific jurisprudence and insisted on more farreaching professional duties. In 1906, William Draper Lewis of the
University of Pennsylvania bemoaned the fact that the organized bar
lacked a sense of obligation to the community and urged practitioners to
look to “the administration of justice in its broadest sense.”120 Lewis
believed that law schools had a special responsibility to train students to
deal with affairs of state by including more public law in the
curriculum.121 During this period, Roscoe Pound advocated that law be
used for “social engineering” and led “the revolt against formalism” that
culminated in the rise of legal realism; later, he retreated from these
views when he became dean of Harvard Law School.122 In 1911, Yale
professor William R. Vance bemoaned the bar’s conventionality and its
resistance to placing social concerns ahead of client interests.123 In fact,
among practicing lawyers, groundbreaking advocate and later Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis stood out both for his receptivity to
considering the general good as “counsel for the situation” and for his
endorsement of an activist role for faculty.124 A few law schools acted
on this progressive vision. The University of Wisconsin pioneered
efforts to train government administrators and began to advise state
officials on policy questions. The Wisconsin idea had considerable
appeal to law professors, who imagined that their unique expertise would
make them influential figures in public life.125

120. William Draper Lewis, Legal Education and the Failure of the Bar to Perform its
Public Duties, AALS PROC. 32, 48-49 (1906).
121. Id. at 49.
122. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 136. Legal realists eventually labeled Pound “an archreactionary” because of the conservative stances he took. Id.
123. William R. Vance, The Ultimate Function of the Teacher of Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV.
2, 6-8 (1911).
124. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer,
105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1501-11 (1996); see also William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The
Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (1985). Brandeis described
a law school professorship “as a fulcrum in efforts to improve the law and through it—
society.” AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 82.
125. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 84-86.
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Using law as a tool for social change often turned on growing the
government bureaucracy. Bar leaders worried that administrative
agencies could undermine judicial authority. As early as 1916, Elihu
Root wrote that: “We are entering upon the creation of a body of
administrative law quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and its
necessary safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific
statutes enforced by the courts.”126 After acknowledging that “[t]here
will be no withdrawal from these experiments,” Root warned that “the
powers that are committed to these regulatory agencies, and which they
must have to do their work, carry with them great and dangerous
opportunities of oppression and wrong. If we are to continue a
government of limited powers, these agencies of regulation must
themselves be regulated.”127
A. The Rise of the New Deal and the Anxiety of the Organized Bar
In the 1930s, the New Deal led to unprecedented growth in federal
regulatory power and brought anxieties about a sprawling and
uncontrolled bureaucracy to the fore. Leading corporate lawyers saw the
Roosevelt Administration’s reforms as a direct attack on the courts and
the profession. As one Chicago attorney put it, “[o]ur prime function is
to implement the existing order. Its sudden destruction . . . implies our
own.”128 Despite this intensely felt opposition to New Deal reforms,
ABA leaders felt the need to tread lightly in expressing their dissent. For
one thing, the public saw corporate lawyers as complicit in predatory
practices and market manipulations that had precipitated the Great
Depression and made the New Deal necessary.129 With some
misgivings, in 1934 the ABA’s General Assembly authorized a New
Deal committee with a broad charge to “study the effect of recent
developments in national legislation and governmental policies, as
affecting the rights and liberties of American citizens and the
maintenance of the guarantees furnished by the United States
Constitution.”130 The committee proved an ill-fated enterprise. As a
126. Elihu Root, Address of the President, 2 A.B.A. J. 736, 749 (1916). For an in-depth
discussion of the early contests over the courts’ role in checking the discretion of
administrative agencies, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 at 9-50 (2014); Blake Emerson,
The Administration of Constitutional Conflict: Structural Transformations in American
Public Law, 1877-1946, in QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIONERO
GIURIDICO MODERNO: GIURISTI E STATO SOCIALE, No. 46, vol. I at 388-94 (Giovanni
Cazzetta ed. 2017).
127. Root, supra note 126, at 749-50.
128. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 192.
129. Id. at 192-93; SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 46, 51.
130. Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
59 A.B.A. REP. 47, 153 (Aug. 1934); see also SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 51.
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result of substantive disagreements and personality conflicts, members
wrote different draft reports, none of which could be accepted and
submitted in final form.131 Despite calls to abandon the effort entirely, a
new committee was appointed; it produced a majority report, a minority
report, and a concurring memorandum.132 Ultimately, the ABA
leadership had to bury the committee’s work because it offered nothing
in the way of practical recommendations.133
One year earlier, the ABA had charged the Committee on
Administrative Law with the narrow task of evaluating “the adequacy
and efficiency of the [government] machinery employed” rather than its
purposes and constitutionality.134 Yet, this committee also had been
hamstrung by divergent agendas. Some solo practitioners demanded that
the ABA denounce the use of non-lawyers in the administrative process
as a way to preserve a growing market for licensed attorneys.135 Still
others wanted to avoid any ABA action that would jeopardize their
already established specialty practices before administrative agencies.136
Corporate lawyers pushed to bring controversies back into the courts or
at least to impose a quasi-judicial process on agencies.137 Faced with
competing demands, the committee chair worried that a report to the
General Assembly would expose a divided bar. The ABA president
apparently agreed, observing that “it would be a good break for [the
chair] if he didn’t have any time to explain the report and if the report
went through more as a formal practice” because “the most dangerous
thing he could do is try to explain it.”138 Over some pointed dissent, the
General Assembly ultimately approved the report, though New Dealers
dismissed the calls for judicial review and quasi-judicial processes as a
product of the ABA’s hostility to the Roosevelt Administration.139
Ongoing skirmishes over leadership revealed the ABA’s dilemma
in addressing New Deal reforms. Some bar leaders wanted to take a hard
line against any changes, while others wanted to adopt a relatively
noncommittal stance as a hedge against uncertainty.140 Confronted with
131. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 54-58.
132. Id. at 59.
133. Id. at 60-62.
134. Louis G. Caldwell, Report of the Committee on Administrative Law, 56 A.B.A. REP.
199 (Aug. 1933); SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 105-06.
135. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 93-99. Lawyers made similar efforts at the state bar level.
RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL 4 (2011) (describing California lawyers’ calls to end
“encroachment” by non-lawyers appearing before state agencies).
136. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 110.
137. Id. at 99-102, 110-11.
138. Id. at 107 (citing Proceedings of the Executive Committee, ABA 121 (Aug. 1934)).
139. Id. The report had no immediate effect, but over time, a number of its procedural
recommendations were adopted. Id. at 107-09.
140. Id. at 57-59, 62.
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the ABA’s wavering efforts to chart a middle course, members with
strong views defected to create organizations of their own. Elite
corporate attorneys formed the National Lawyers’ Committee of the
American Liberty League to contest the legality of federal agencies’
expanded authority.141 These attorneys made their hostility to the
Roosevelt administration plain and openly counseled clients to defy
government mandates as unconstitutional usurpations of power.142 By
contrast, lawyers who supported New Deal programs saw the changes as
an opportunity to reinvigorate the profession’s public-regarding
obligations. In late 1936, some of these attorneys founded the National
Lawyers Guild as an alternative voice for the profession.143 The Guild
rejected “the corporate law identity of the ABA” as well as “its active
involvement in conservative politics.”144 Law professors joined liberal
and radical attorneys to lead the effort; notably, the executive board
included Charles Hamilton Houston, the African-American dean of
Howard Law School, at a time when the ABA remained all-white.145
The Guild primarily appealed to “low-income, low-status urban
practitioners along the East and West coasts,”146 the very kind of lawyers
that elite practitioners had seen as a threat to the profession during the
first age of modern American lawyering.
Though unanimous in rejecting the ABA’s leadership, Guild
members agreed about little else. Internal politics, especially clashes
between liberal and radical factions, “prevented the guild from becoming
the powerful counterweight to the ABA that its founders had
envisioned.147 However, some local chapters launched innovative
programs to provide neighborhood legal services to low- and middleincome clients.148 These efforts were especially noteworthy, given the
organized bar’s general indifference to problems of the needy.149 Law
professor Karl Llewellyn had hoped that junior attorneys at large firms
would staff legal services programs in Chicago on a pro bono basis as an
antidote to the profession’s rampant individualism and insensitivity to
community needs.150 Privately, he even considered proposing a tax on
large firms to subsidize the services but did not pursue the idea, perhaps

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 193.
SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 67-69.
AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 203.
AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 203-09.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
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because he concluded that partners were “so highly specialized in
corporate work that they are out of touch with the little man’s need.”151
Despite efforts to present a united front, schisms between elite and
non-elite practitioners were becoming evident. Confronted with a
splintering of authority to speak on behalf of the profession, the ABA
was able to reassert itself decisively only when the Roosevelt
Administration tried to undermine the power and stature of the United
States Supreme Court.152 The justices had struck down New Deal
legislation by constitutionalizing a laissez-faire approach to economic
rights, and government officials were determined to nullify the
decisions. To do that, President Roosevelt had to take on the “Four
Horsemen,”153 the conservative wing of the Court that had persuaded
Justice Owen Roberts to join them in blocking reforms. Roosevelt’s
Court packing plan proposed to add one new justice for each member
who had served ten years and was over seventy years old. By allowing
Roosevelt to appoint six new justices, the plan would leave the
Horsemen an outnumbered minority.154 In fighting this blatant attack on
the Court’s legitimacy, the ABA was able to unite its membership in
defense of the rule of law and the integrity of the judicial process.155 The
ABA launched a vigorous campaign against Roosevelt’s plan, but the
efforts became moot when one of the Horsemen announced his
impending retirement and the crucial swing vote, Justice Roberts,
changed tack on the constitutionality of New Deal programs. 156 With
Roberts’ defection, a majority of the justices supported the Roosevelt
Administration’s reforms, the “switch in time that saved nine.”157
B. Dueling Elites: Government Lawyers and the Corporate Bar
The battle over the Court’s fate was short-lived, but the effects of
shifting government power on the profession were long-lasting. The
expansion of federal power created a new avenue to elite status as a
lawyer, one that challenged the exclusive prerogatives of the corporate
151. Id.
152. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 77-78.
153. Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 10
(2013).
154. PAUL CARRINGTON, AMERICAN LAWYER 531-33 (2012); THE MAKING OF THE NEW
DEAL 41, 47 (Katie Louchheim ed., Harvard Uni. Press) (1983). For a comprehensive history
of the battle over the Court-packing plan, see LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK (1967).
155. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 78-80.
156. CARRINGTON, supra note 154, at 533-34. Another conservative member of the
Court, Justice Sutherland, declared his intent to retire as well. Cushman, supra note 153, at
6. Interestingly, President Roosevelt refused to compromise on his Court-packing plan even
after Justice Van Devanter announced his retirement. Id.
157. Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the
New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 459 (2001).
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bar.158 Many Roosevelt Administration attorneys had previously been
excluded from the most powerful corporate law firms because they were
Jewish or Catholic.159 These attorneys had gone to elite law schools, but
even when they excelled, they found their opportunities blocked at large
firms in major cities.160 With the Roosevelt Administration recruiting
attorneys to advance its ambitious reform agenda, some faculty at top
schools encouraged their best Jewish and Catholic students to sign on.
This entrée to practice was especially important for Jewish students who
were clustered at the top of their law school classes but at the bottom of
the urban bar.161
The New Deal’s “plague of young lawyers”162 was steeped in the
knowledge, skills, and values typical of leading law schools, and despite
allegations that the freshly minted graduates were radical
revolutionaries, they embraced American legalism, especially its
preoccupation with process. As a result, administrative agencies
ultimately came to rely on notice-and-comment rulemaking, public
hearings, and quasi-judicial tribunals.163 Though some of these gifted
attorneys remained in public service, many left to establish firms
devoted to regulatory practice or to join new administrative law practice
groups at the elite firms that once had shunned them.164 If New York
and Chicago were strongholds of the corporate bar, Washington, D.C.
became home to influential firms specializing in administrative law and
legislative lobbying.165 The New Deal gave birth to a cadre of elite
lawyers who rivaled the corporate bar, a recalibration of power that

158. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 78-80.
159. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 185. Blacks and women also faced barriers to
inclusion, but the New Deal did little to rectify their limited opportunities. Jerold S. Auerbach,
Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade, in THE NEW DEAL 133, 160 (John
Braeman et al. eds. 1975) [hereinafter Auerbach, Lawyers and Social Change in the
Depression Decade].
160. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 29, 184-86.
161. Id. at 184. Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School, himself a rarity as a Jewish
faculty member at a prestigious school, was an especially prominent source of referrals, but
outstanding students also arrived from Yale and Columbia. Id. at 169-70; CARRINGTON,
supra note 154, at 523-24 (describing how Frankfurter’s New Deal proteges were referred to
as the “Happy Hot Dogs”).
162. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 2 (1982) (citing George Peek, an
agricultural economist who headed the Agricultural Adjustment Administration during the
Roosevelt Administration).
163. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 221-24.
164. Id. at 226-28. As Bruce Alan Murphy explained in his biography of Abe Fortas,
there were “two camps of alumni from the Roosevelt era in 1946: those who labored further
for a New Deal for the nation, and those who wanted a ‘new deal’ for themselves.” B RUCE
ALAN MURPHY, FORTAS 72 (1988).
165. CARRINGTON, supra note 154, at 539.
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permitted Jews in particular to overcome barriers that had prevented
them from converting academic credentials into law firm partnerships.166
The struggle over the New Deal was rooted in the corporate bar’s
resistance to a rival form of lawyering. Given these concerns, one might
have expected the ABA to revisit its code of professional conduct to
address the ethics of government lawyering. However, internal divisions
over the implications of the rise of the administrative state made that
approach impossible. As a result, the rise of the New Deal “did not
significantly alter lawyers’ degree of regulation (or non-regulation) by
either legislation, the courts, or their bar associations.”167 Instead, the
organized bar focused on conflicts of interest that arose when lawyers
went through the “revolving door” of government service to work in
private practice. This approach minimized the comparative advantages
of administrative lawyers when they left their official posts to compete
with the corporate bar for business.168
As early as 1908, the ABA had adopted Canon 6, which addressed
an attorney’s duty to refrain from representing clients whose interests
were in conflict with those of another client, in this case, the prior
government employer, and to disclose any possible conflicts.169 That
canon made no attempt to address a lawyer’s ethical obligations while in
government service.170 In 1928, as the role of state agencies expanded
during the Progressive era, the bar adopted Canon 36, which clarified
that former government attorneys, including judges, should not accept
employment if it related to matters previously handled in an official
capacity.171 Even these admittedly modest strictures were criticized. As
Judge Irving Kaufman explained in a 1957 article, an unduly pharisaical
application of the canons might discourage attorneys from undertaking
public service and inhibit them from using specialized knowledge
acquired as government officials.172
166. Auerbach, Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade, supra note 159, at
144, 150-51.
167. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics—II the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 222 n.59 (2002).
168. Auerbach, Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade, supra note 159, at
164; AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 228-30.
169. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 6 (1908).
170. John C. Blakslee, Notes on Professional Ethics: Conflicting Interests, 55 A.B.A. J.
162 (1969).
171. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 36 (1928). In 1948, Congress
enacted legislation that prohibited lawyers from prosecuting claims against the United States
for a period of two years if those claims involved subject matter related to prior government
service. 18 U.S.C. § 284. These provisions were strengthened in 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 207;
H.R. REP. NO. 87–748, at 2, 4, 22-23 (1962); S. REP. NO. 87–2213, at 4, 7, 12 (1962), reprinted
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3852-53, 3856, 3861.
172. Irving R. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957).
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With the ABA unable to offer clear guidance on the ethical
obligations of government lawyers, the legal academy could have
stepped in to fill the gap. However, the legal realist movement, which
had inspired so many New Deal attorneys, failed to afford much
direction because it mainly attacked the status quo.173 Without a clearcut
model of legal professionalism, agency attorneys came to understand
their role in terms of technical expertise, much as officials from other
professional disciplines did.174 This turn from social trustee to expert
professionalism went largely unnoticed because government work was
automatically equated with service to the general public. That glib
equivalency ignored the ambiguities inherent in a political environment
that made it difficult to discern who the client was, much less what the
client’s needs and wishes were. These uncertainties allowed government
attorneys to wield considerable authority in making value judgments
about the common welfare, a problem that persists to this day.175 Such
wide-ranging discretion could not be readily cabined through a
straightforward application of technical expertise. As a result, the gap
between value-making and expert professionalism sometimes led to
“amoral instrumentalism.”176 As legal historian G. Edward White
concluded, an emphasis on pragmatism and experience led to “a
relativistic and experimentalist approach toward morals as well as
toward other issues.”177 These lacunae in the government lawyer’s
173. Gordon, supra note 40, at 100 (describing legal realism as “protean” and subject to
myriad interpretations and manipulations). Interestingly, one concrete example of the
application of legal realism to real-world problems involved the civil rights movement. In the
early 1930s, Columbia law professor Karl Llewellyn wrote a foreword that drew on legal
realist principles to support the National Association of Colored People’s brief challenging
Southern officials’ complicity in lynchings and demanding federal intervention. Alfred L.
Brophy, “Cold Legal Points into Points of Flame”: Karl Llewellyn Attacks Lynching, UNC
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2619895
(June
17,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619895.
174. See IRONS, supra note 162, at 7-8 (describing how Frankfurter prepared students to
serve as “the emerging mandarinate of the state”); Gordon, supra note 40, at 100 (describing
how legal realism led to “a naïve faith in technocracy” or, even worse admiration of “an
extremely antidemocratic and even fascist administration if it proved itself ‘efficient’ ” ).
These trends echoed an emphasis on expertise as the basis for law professors’ participation in
a Progressive agenda earlier in the century. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 83-84.
175. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 10, at 644-45; Note,
Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1170, 1170 (2002). See also Edward Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the Administrative State,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1343-45 (2009) (describing how the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct focus on the traditional role of lawyers and litigators and fail to address
the role of lawyers in a regulatory practice).
176. Note, supra note 175, at 1187-88 (questioning the amorality of instrumentalism in
government practice and arguing that agency lawyers must “help the agency develop its
position in a way that is consistent with democratic values”).
177. G. Edward White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, Lecture at Harvard Law School,
Sept. 19, 1989, at 61. White linked this to problems when attorneys left government for
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professional identity cried out for guidance, but the bar had none to
provide, given the distrust that divided the ABA and the Roosevelt
Administration.
C. Legal Realism, New Deal Activism, and the Triumph of Incremental
Curricular Reform
As the New Deal altered the balance of power between corporate
and government lawyers, it also changed the relationship between the
legal profession and the academy. Law professors who played an active
role in supporting the Roosevelt Administration exemplified Langdell’s
desire for an independent academy even as they attacked formalism and
pretensions to scientific method in adjudication. Yale Law School was
a hotbed of legal realism and New Deal activism, commitments that were
a self-conscious intellectual revolt against Harvard’s octopus-like
hegemony. As historian Robert Gordon explains,
Perhaps Harvard’s most important contribution to the development
of Yale was to give it something solid to define itself by, a heavy
successful father both to emulate and to hurl itself against in
rebellion. Harvard’s was a dogmatic tradition that inspired
antidogmatism,
a
disciplinary
isolation
that
inspired
interdisciplinary experiment, a grave condescension and assumption
of superiority that inspired the urge to ridicule and destroy. 178

Directly contradicting the case method, legal realists asserted that
jurists do not discover law in a neutral and impartial way but instead are
influenced by personal backgrounds, beliefs, and attitudes.179 Legal
realism blurred the boundary between law and politics—both were
interest-driven processes of negotiation and compromise—and so
undercut the claim that the judicial process is inherently superior to
legislative and administrative decision-making.180 A legal realist
perspective bolstered the New Deal’s assault on the primacy of courts as
the ultimate arbiters of legal principles. The justices who blocked the
Roosevelt Administration’s reforms could be impugned as captives of

private practice. As he noted, “[o]ne of the singular aspects of the careers of several prominent
New Deal lawyers is their association, after they left government service, with allegedly
improper legal or ethical practices.” Id. at 60. One historian put the point more bluntly,
concluding that children of the New Deal simply assumed that the rules did not apply to them.
MURPHY, supra note 164, at 593-94. Later, abuses by government lawyers during the
Watergate scandal would prompt the ABA to promote ethics training in law schools. See infra
note 198.
178. Gordon, supra note 40, at 98.
179. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 141, 143-46; see also STEVENS, supra note 42, at 134-35.
180. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 168-69, 210-11
(2000).
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their own outmoded and tendentious world-views: The Horsemen were
riding into the apocalypse, rather than looking to the future.
In the mid-1930s, as the rhetoric of legal realism wore thin at Yale,
the New Deal presented a welcome opportunity to put theory into
practice.181 Jerome Frank, an adjunct professor at Yale and member of
the Roosevelt Administration, recruited many friends on the faculty for
leadership positions at federal agencies.182 In 1934-35, eight of Yale
Law School’s professors were “on part-time or full-time loan to the
government.”183 As a result, the law school “became thoroughly
identified in the public mind with the New Deal, to the perpetual
consternation of many Yale College alumni.”184 Campus and law school
administrators were forced to “spen[d] an inordinate amount of time
fending off conservative complaints that Yale Law School was just an
outpost of Roosevelt’s Red Revolution.”185 Nor were alumni alone in
expressing this concern. By 1939, “the Chicago Tribune illustrated a
series about the school with a cartoon showing the Yale law faculty
hoisting the hammer and sickle over the Sterling Law Building. An
accompanying story said students were more likely to read Karl Marx
than William Blackstone.”186
Given the high-profile controversy, it should come as no surprise
that New Dealers on the Yale faculty alarmed and angered conservative
academic colleagues.187
The tensions created an increasingly
uncomfortable situation that tested the boundaries of both academic duty
and academic freedom. As New Dealers spent more time in Washington,
D.C. and away from their academic posts, a number of them were denied
appointments, threatened with loss of their teaching positions, or forced
to resign.188 Reflecting on the difficulties, the President of Yale
concluded that “law faculties tend to harbor relatively more men of
leftward-leaning political tendencies than are found in academic groups
generally. It is at variance, I should say, with the prevailing trend in bar
and bench and probably reflects the theoretical, as contrasted with the
practice, attitudes of mind.”189 In reaching this conclusion, the
President—wittingly or unwittingly—lent credence to Langdell’s notion
that law faculty would be empowered to challenge the practicing bar’s
conventions. What Langdell might not have fully anticipated, however,
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Gordon, supra note 40, at 141.
Id.; ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER 71-72 (1985).
Gordon, supra note 40, at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 86, 108, 111, 115.
Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
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were the deep schisms that could emerge when attorneys and academics
found themselves at loggerheads over the profession’s future.
Despite the Chicago Tribune’s fear that Yale Law students were
more likely to read Marx than Blackstone, changes in the law school
curriculum as a result of the New Deal were quite modest. Not
surprisingly, given that Harvard’s dominance was predicated on
Langdellian formalism, its faculty’s response to calls for curricular
reform was tepid. At a 1937 meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools, Professor Sidney Post Simpson described an institution
largely satisfied with its dominant pedagogy: “The curriculum of
Harvard Law School was completely revised in 1877, and thereafter
there were some changes made, some new courses put in, a few old ones
taken out, although a law school course seems to be something like a
person in the civil service—once it gets in, there it stays.” 190 Even so, in
1934, the faculty decided once again to reconsider the school’s course
offerings.191 This decision was driven by growing student dissatisfaction
with the case method and a bland selection of classes.192
Simpson reported that upon careful consideration, the faculty had
decided to devote the first two years of instruction to mandated courses
so that students would be grounded in “the minimum basic requirements
for a member of the bar.”193 Despite the New Deal’s transformative
impact, Simpson noted that “there is no required instruction in public
law at all.”194 Instead, the faculty preferred a wait-and-see attitude to
determine whether “the answer is a course, in the second year in
constitutional and administrative law, in the institutions of government,
as every lawyer must know about them” or “a requirement of some
degree of concentration in public law.”195 Rejecting the legal realist
approach, Simpson remarked that Harvard’s curricular changes did not
emphasize legal history or comparative law and jurisprudence, as some
sister schools’ programs did.196 Nor was there a course on legal ethics,
much less one on the unique ethical challenges facing government

190. Address of Sidney P. Simpson, Law School Objectives and Methods: Developments
in the Law School Curriculum and in Teaching Methods, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1038, 1039
(1938) [hereinafter Address of Sidney P. Simpson].
191. Id.
192. For competing accounts of the events at Harvard, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH
CITADEL 64-67 (1978); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 283-86 (1967).
See generally STEVENS, supra note 42, at 137 (describing a student attack on the Harvard
curriculum in 1935 as the committee was doing its work).
193. Address of Sidney P. Simpson, supra note 190, at 1040.
194. Id. at 1042.
195. Id. at 1043.
196. Id. There were no legal realists on the Harvard faculty at this time. IRONS, supra
note 162, at 7.
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lawyers, an omission for which there were “no apologies to make.”197
As Simpson elaborated,
[I]f I am sure of anything, it is that a formal course on Legal Ethics
is not helpful in [transmitting the tradition of a learned and public
profession] . . . or, in my judgment, in any other regard. It may be a
course on legal etiquette, which I think is unnecessary. It may be a
course in ‘how far a lawyer can safely go,’ which I believe to be
pernicious. It may be a course of hortatory moral instruction, which
seems to me perfectly useless. Or it may be a bar cram course on the
Canons, which seems to me beneath the dignity of the university law
school.198

As Simpson’s remarks made abundantly clear, Langdellian
formalism still carried the day at Harvard—which remained largely free
of public law, jurisprudential theories, or even legal ethics. Clearly, the
educational octopus would not be growing new tentacles to reach the
practice environments of an emerging breed of government lawyers.
By contrast, both Yale and Columbia embarked on ambitious
though unsuccessful curricular reform efforts. As early as 1916, Yale
considered a program of interdisciplinary study as well as courses in
“administration and perfecting its methods of legislation.”199 This
experiment proved premature, but Columbia launched a similar effort in
1928.200 Reformers emphasized the importance of using the social
sciences and empirical methods to train students for public service, and
by 1932, Columbia had hired a number of faculty with expertise in
disciplines like finance, economics, philosophy, and political science.201
The call for curricular change split the faculty and alarmed the dean, who
worried that any shift would undermine the law school’s standing as “a
first-grade professional school” that trained students for private
practice.202 The innovations at Columbia ultimately failed to take root,
and some leading proponents decamped for Yale, where the reformist
impulse persisted and would take on newfound relevance with the advent
of the New Deal.203

197. Address of Sidney P. Simpson, supra note 190, at 1043.
198. Id. In fact, instruction in legal ethics did not become a universal feature of American
legal education until the 1970s. The change came at least partly in response to the Watergate
scandal in which high-ranking lawyers in the Nixon administration were convicted of criminal
misconduct as a result of their ethical lapses. Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and
Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 61, 67-68 (2003).
199. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 135.
200. Id. at 137-40.
201. Id. at 139; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 75 (1986).
202. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 139.
203. Id. at 140-41.
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At Yale, professors mainly expressed their support for legal realism
by conducting empirical research on legal matters.204 As faculty
returned from service in the Roosevelt Administration, they added
upper-division electives that focused on various facets of administrative
law.205 These new courses eventually found their way from elite law
schools to less prestigious—even unaccredited—ones.206 The addition
of electives did not fundamentally alter the core curriculum, however,
prompting one New Dealer to offer a more ambitious vision. Jerome
Frank believed that “clinical-lawyer” schools should be modeled on
medical instruction.207
Directly contradicting Langdell’s hiring
philosophy, Frank argued that law professors should have extensive
practical experience. This would enable them to use real and simulated
legal problems to prepare students for professional life.208 Frank’s
proposal gained little traction among his faculty allies at Yale, not just
because they lacked practical experience themselves but also because
they worried that the bar’s inherent conservatism would dampen
creativity in legal research and teaching.209 Despite Frank’s call for
practice-oriented instruction, most reform initiatives of the day focused
on making the law school curriculum either more interdisciplinary, as
was true at the University of Chicago, or more specialized, as was true
at Northwestern.210
During the second age of modern American lawyering, the
organized bar once again struggled to preserve the image of a unified
profession by suppressing the reality of pluralism in law practice.
Earlier, the corporate bar had worked to conceal stratification and to
marginalize urban practitioners who served poor, immigrant, and
working-class clients. With the arrival of the New Deal, bar leaders had
to rebuff a competing source of legal authority: government lawyers at
highly influential federal agencies. During the first age of modern
American lawyering, there had been considerable social and
204. Id. at 140.
205. Id. at 160.
206. Id. at 168 n.40. According to legal scholar Edward Rubin, these courses did not—
and still do not—address the ethical obligations of a regulatory practice. Rubin, supra note
175, at 1345-50.
207. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933);
Gordon, supra note 40, at 101.
208. Gordon, supra note 40, at 101.
209. Id. at 101, 130-31 n.71.
210. Charles T. McCormick, Leon Green and Legal Education, 43 ILL. L. REV. 5, 9-11
(1948); Address of Malcolm P. Sharp, Law School Objectives and Methods: Developments in
the Law School Curriculum and in Teaching Methods, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1038, 1044-45
(1938). Perhaps presciently, Professor Malcolm Sharp predicted that “the other great division
of our non-legal material, economics, will prove somewhat easier to integrate with our strictly
legal curriculum.” Id. For a description of the limited impact that legal realism had on the
law school curriculum, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 567-68.
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professional distance between corporate lawyers and upstart urban
practitioners. During the second age, bar leaders and the new breed of
government lawyer had much in common, even though they were locked
in a power struggle. Both were products of elite law schools and shared
many professional values, most notably a commitment to legal process.
As a result, government lawyers and the organized bar eventually were
able to find common ground in a shared commitment to safeguarding the
integrity of the courts and to regularizing the administrative process.
The desire for a unified professional image led bar leaders to
minimize differences in practice environments that challenged
conventional notions about client representation.
In particular,
government practice upset the assumption that lawyers can readily
ascertain and advance client interests. With multiple stakeholders and
competing agendas, agency attorneys enjoyed considerable latitude to
inject their own preferences into purportedly neutral and impartial
decision-making on behalf of “the people.”211 If private lawyers’
independence came from having their own practices, the salaried
government lawyer’s autonomy largely derived from the uncertainty of
the client’s identity. Instead of tackling this discrepancy, the bar ignored
it, and government lawyers adopted a model of expert professionalism
like that of other agency staff, an approach that did little to resolve the
special ethical challenges facing government attorneys. As a result,
social trusteeship remained an underdeveloped concept, even as
Roosevelt Administration lawyers boldly embarked on structural
reforms that would transform American life and politics.
The law school curriculum offered a similar picture of stasis in the
face of major innovation in lawyering. Although legal realism had
offered provocative challenges to the conventional wisdom, this school
of thought was less successful in producing affirmative frameworks to
understand the implications of New Deal reforms. Concerns about
conservative backlash and the ongoing emphasis on placing students in
private practice led to curricular changes that were decidedly
incremental. In the face of this inertia in the profession and the academy,
the relationship between social trustee and expert professionalism
remained unclear. This uneasy coexistence produced paradoxical
results. Private lawyers who primarily sold their expertise in the
marketplace insisted on their roles as social trustees in the service of an
211. William Josephson and Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe
the Duty of Loyalty when Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539, 539-41 (1986); Catherine
J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 967 (1991); James R. Harvey III,
Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients,
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1996).
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amorphous public obligation. Meanwhile, government lawyers who
served an amorphous client known as the people insisted on their roles
as impartial and objective experts. The unsettled distinction between
social trustee and expert professionalism was the price of preserving the
image of a unified bar. The third age of modern American lawyering
would challenge this inherently unstable rapprochement by offering an
entirely different account of an attorney’s service to clients and publicregarding obligations.
III. THE THIRD AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE OF
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE PUSH FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
AND A PEDAGOGY OF DIVERSITY
The third age of modern American lawyering emerged in the wake
of World War II, forged in the segregated and unequal world of the
African-American bar and historically black law schools.212 Excluded
from elite legal circles and confronted with limited resources, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP)’s Legal Defense and Education Fund (the Inc. Fund) worked
with Howard Law School to launch a litigation campaign that would
dismantle state-mandated segregation. These crusading civil rights
lawyers placed great faith in the law and its capacity to advance social
change. The success of their efforts inspired other forms of cause
lawyering, led to the expansion of clinical legal education, and
introduced diversity into law school student bodies. Despite the original
civil rights advocates’ deep commitment to consummate lawyering, the
complexity of structural and systemic change led others to question this
law-centric framework.
A. Civil Rights: From Law-Centric Credo to Backlash from the Left
and the Right
The Inc. Fund’s campaign for civil rights was guided by a belief
that law, particularly judge-made law, could catalyze broad social
change. As a result, attorneys were essential leaders in efforts to end
state-mandated segregation of the races.213 The persistence of
212. Though the NAACP and Howard Law School played a leading role in the rise of
cause lawyering, the American Civil Liberties Union was also of central importance. See
SAMUEL WALKER, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY xvi-xix (1992) (describing the ACLU’s founding in 1920 and the pathbreaking cases it litigated beginning in the mid-1960s as it made greater use of paid staff
attorneys).
213. Thomas Hilbink, The Profession, the Grassroots and the Elite: Cause Lawyering for
Civil Rights and Freedom in the Direct Action Era, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 60, 64 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 2006); LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996). But cf. Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking
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segregation itself was a reminder of law’s past failures and profound
power to subordinate blacks.214 The races remained separated in
significant part because the United States Supreme Court had
legitimated the “separate but equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson215 in
1896, closing off efforts to reconstruct the South after the Civil War.
Confronted with real separation but fictive equality, the Inc. Fund set
about demonstrating that stark disparities between black and white
educational institutions were unacceptable badges of racial inferiority.
Along with challenges to disenfranchisement and discrimination in the
criminal justice system, the NAACP pursued litigation to promote equal
educational opportunity. Early cases targeted graduate and professional
programs, where any semblance of equality was hard to achieve given
the high cost of quality instruction.216 After victories in dismantling
segregation in higher education, Inc. Fund lawyers turned their attention
to public elementary and secondary schools, a strategy that culminated
in the Supreme Court’s 1954 landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,217 which unanimously held that separate schools are
inherently unequal.
Challenges to the Inc. Fund’s law-centric credo came when the
justices temporized on matters of implementation. In Brown II,218 the
Court held that school integration should proceed “with all deliberate
speed,” a gradualism that stymied meaningful progress.219 Despite this
setback, the NAACP maintained its faith in law’s remedial possibilities,
concluding in its 1963 annual report that: “There is only one way. Those
who believe that rights must be found in law and ultimately rest upon
law must make a massive effort to use law to solve America’s race
problem.”220 Despite an unwavering belief in law’s promise, the Inc.
Fund received no meaningful help from the organized bar. In contrast
to the National Lawyers Guild, which had admitted black members from
Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 265-71
(2005) (legal liberal interpretations of the desegregation strategy at Howard and the Inc. Fund
were imposed after the fact and did not capture the complexity of the decision-making
process).
214. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 6-7 (3d ed. 1974).
215. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
216. Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Can., 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S.
631 (1948) (per curiam); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). See generally KLUGER, supra note 23, at 256-84 (describing
the history of the NAACP’s efforts to desegregate institutions of higher education). For a
description of the early origins of the NAACP’s legal agenda, see SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING
THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880-1915 at 249-86 (2013).
217. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
218. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
219. Id. at 301.
220. Hilbink, supra note 213, at 64 (citing NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Annual Report (1963)) (emphasis in original).
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its inception, the ABA did not do so until 1943, only eleven years before
Brown was decided. During the 1950s, the ABA largely ignored the
NAACP’s campaign for civil rights, and by the 1960s, it still was
maintaining a studied distance.221 Invoking a narrow view of social
trusteeship obligations, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote in
1965 that “the prevailing view is that the Association must follow a
policy of noninvolvement in political and emotionally controversial
issues—however important they may be—unless they relate directly to
the administration of justice.”222
As the ABA sought to remain neutral on civil rights issues, bar
associations in the South, including Powell’s home state of Virginia,
moved to thwart Inc. Fund lawyers by invoking ethical canons against
solicitation and barratry, the very provisions once used to undercut urban
immigrant practitioners.223 Civil rights attorneys regularly held
meetings with community members to inform them about the legal
assistance available to bring school desegregation claims. 224 As part of
massive resistance to the Brown ruling, Southern bar associations
asserted that the Inc. Fund’s outreach efforts were unethical forms of
solicitation and demanded sanctions against the lawyers involved.225
State courts agreed, handing down decisions that would have stifled
efforts to enforce Brown in federal court.226 The United States Supreme
Court put an end to this obstructionist strategy, finding that the
NAACP’s activities qualified as protected forms of speech and
association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.227 Yet, as
Supreme Court historian Mark Tushnet has observed, the decision was a
close one that could easily have gone the other way. 228

221. MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 64. In part, this reflected ongoing concerns that the
NAACP had ties to the Communist Party. Id. at 66-67.
222. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The President’s Page, 51 A.B.A. J. 101, 101 (1965).
223. MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 65, 79.
224. Id. at 70.
225. See, e.g., Virginia Bar Challenges NAACP Methods in School Cases, THE FREE
LANCE-STAR, June 30, 1959; NAACP Methods Scored in Suit by Virginia Bar, TUSCALOOSA
NEWS, June 30, 1959. See generally MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 70-71.
226. See, e.g., NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 146-55, 116 S.E. 55, 60-66 (1960)
(condemning the NAACP’s “fomenting and soliciting legal business in which they are not
parties and have no pecuniary right or liability, and which they channel to the enrichment of
certain lawyers employed by them, at no cost to the litigants and over which the litigants have
no control”).
227. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963). The United States Supreme Court
later built on the Button decision to distinguish between ethical concerns about solicitation in
purely commercial settings, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), and
protected First Amendment outreach to underserved clients, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978).
228. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 277-82 (1994).
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The Court’s endorsement of the Inc. Fund’s outreach efforts paved
the way for broad reconsideration of ethical restrictions on lawyers’
ability to compete on price and advertise.229 In a Virginia case, a couple
challenged the state bar’s minimum fee schedules as an antitrust
violation. The bar responded that law was a learned profession, rather
than a commercial enterprise, so there could be no improper restraint of
trade.230 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that
the fee schedule, far from being flexible and advisory, operated as a rigid
floor on prices.231 Not long thereafter, attorneys at a legal clinic in
Arizona sought to advertise their low-cost services. The state bar argued
that the “hustle of the marketplace” would “bring about
commercialization,” “adversely affect the profession’s service
orientation, irreparably damage the delicate balance between the
lawyer’s need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve,” and “tarnish
the dignified public image of the profession.”232 Rejecting all of these
arguments, the justices concluded that state bars could at most regulate
false and misleading advertising.233 As legal scholar James Moliterno
notes, by focusing exclusively on consumer protection, the Court’s
“false advertising language . . . would now apply to lawyers and used car
salesmen alike.”234
Ironically, then, instead of broadening the
boundaries of the bar’s notions of social trustee professionalism, the civil
rights movement actually strengthened a free-market approach to
lawyering that elevated expert professionalism.
The uncertain implications of the civil rights movement for social
trusteeship were further complicated when activists called into question
the primacy of law as a tool for social reform. Lack of progress in
enforcing school desegregation mandates led some African-American
leaders to question the relevance of attorneys and courts. As an
alternative, grass-roots reformers demanded direct action through civil
disobedience and organized protest.235 As legal studies scholar Thomas
Hilbink explains, “From the [NAACP’s] perspective, the goal was to
establish legal principles first and foremost—putting them at odds with
activists who saw protest as not merely a way of establishing a principle,
229. MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 89.
230. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1973).
231. Id. at 791-92.
232. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
233. Id. at 383-84. Most recently, a Florida attorney successfully challenged state bar
limits on advertising past results in cases as a violation of commercial speech rights.
Rubenstein v. Fla. Bar, 72 F.Supp. 3d 1298, 1312-18 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
234. MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 92.
235. Hilbink, supra note 213, at 64, 69-71. See generally TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN,
COURAGE TO DISSENT 336-39 (2011) (Inc. Fund lawyers neglected community-building
despite early recognition of its importance to legal success and alienated some constituencies
as a result).
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but involving people in their own liberation and thus challenging a
culture of oppression.”236 The tensions came to a head in the 1960s. The
Inc. Fund sought to establish clear boundaries for lawyers representing
members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
during voter registration drives in the South. In particular, NAACP
lawyers insisted that SNCC activists decline representation by the
National Lawyers Guild, a demand that SNCC rejected.237 Instead,
SNCC expressed concerns about the Inc. Fund’s reluctance to file suits
to protect protestors’ rights and to defend those who were arrested.238
At this point, the relationship between the NAACP and advocates
of direct action had grown so tense that President John F. Kennedy
thought it necessary to assemble an elite group of attorneys to manage
racial unrest in the South. 239 The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law (LCCRUL) was co-directed by two leading members of the
organized bar: Bernard Segal, a Philadelphia attorney who would
become the ABA’s president, and Harrison Tweed, a New York law firm
partner and former president of the American Law Institute and the New
York City Bar Association.240 Tweed insisted on adding “under law” to
the committee’s name to make clear that the group was dedicated to legal
process and condemned violence.241 As the nomenclature suggested,
LCCRUL shared the Inc. Fund’s belief in the primacy of legal remedies,
insisting that “the spectacle of repeated violations of law, actual or
apparent, by those who are pressing the fight for civil rights is deeply
troubling to many thoughtful persons who reject the notion that the end
justifies the means . . . .”242 Initially, Segal and Tweed asked local
lawyers in the South to represent activists, but when these efforts proved
insufficient, LCCRUL sent attorneys there to give “ ‘ objective’ legal
assistance without succumbing to the ‘emotionally-charged atmosphere
of Freedom Summer.’ ” 243
The eighteen lawyers who ultimately participated were to assist
ministers from the National Council of Churches in their efforts to
counter repressive tactics designed to suppress civil rights activism.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Hilbink, supra note 213, at 64, 69-71.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 66.
JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 195; GEORGE MARTIN AND FRANCIS T. PLIMPTON,
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 248 (1997); Hilbink, supra note 213, at 66.
241. Id.
242. Harrison Tweed, Bernard G. Segal, and Herbert Packer, Civil Rights and Civil
Disobedience to Law, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 90, 90 (Hugo A. Bedau ed. 1969).
243. Hilbink, supra note 213, at 69 (citing Unsigned memo (likely Jack Pratt), “Request
for Lawyers for Summer Work in Southern States,” (undated but circa 1964), Mississippi
Summer Project 1964 (Apr.-June 1964) File, Box 40, LCCRUL Papers, Wesleyan University
Library, Special Collections and Archives, Middletown, CT).
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LCCRUL attorneys were limited to individual representation and were
not to pursue impact litigation or other forms of advocacy.244 Yet, as
these lawyers witnessed the realities of segregation and massive
resistance, they chafed at the restrictions. The most outspoken critics of
LCCRUL’s policies on lawyering were derided as “going SNCC,” but
in fact, many of these attorneys came to conclude that
their value [should be measured] not in terms of legal victories won
or representation provided. Rather, lawyers saw their presence as
the value. Their presence—in the streets, in COFO [Council of
Federated Organizations] Freedom Houses, in jails, in courtrooms—
played a role in deterring white Southerners, and particularly state
actors, from meting out greater violence and lawlessness against the
movement.245

Like other attorneys who subsequently identified as cause lawyers,
these LCCRUL lawyers saw their place in social movements as distinct:
Law was one among many tools for reform, lawyers had to collaborate
with clients, and there was no bright line between law and politics.246
In the wake of the civil rights movement, other cause lawyers
successfully employed a combination of litigation, lobbying, and grassroots activism in the 1960s and 1970s, in part because they came to enjoy
at least grudging recognition from the bar.247 This acceptance was
motivated by a “crisis of professionalism” prompted by the slow pace of
desegregation, the skullduggery of high-ranking attorneys in the Nixon
administration during the Watergate scandal, and strong opposition
among rank-and-file bar members to creation of a national legal services
program.248 As historian Jerold S. Auerbach explains, these lapses in
social responsibility made attorneys seem like nothing more than hired
guns and left the ABA on the wrong side of history.249 Faced with these
pressing challenges, bar leaders recognized the importance to their
professional standing of embracing law as an instrument of social
reform.

244. Id. at 67-68.
245. Id. at 77 (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 71, 78.
247. SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 28, at 4, 23, 25, 40.
A high-water mark was a 1977 article in the New York Times Magazine by Judge Marvin
Frankel, advocating publicly subsidized legal services for all of those in need as “a community
universal service” that would be “an essential step toward our proclaimed goal of equal
justice.” Marvin E. Frankel, An Immodest Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1977, at 92.
248. SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 28, at 40-41, 49;
JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 105-06.
249. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 263.
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B. Legal Services: From the War on Poverty to the War on Lawyers
To address growing cynicism about the legal profession’s
leadership and vision, ABA President Lewis Powell, Jr. worked in the
mid-1960s to craft a compromise that would win support for the
fledgling legal services program in the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO).250 Originally part of President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s War
on Poverty, OEO had been perceived as a threat to private legal aid
societies as well as solo and small firm practices.251 Powell addressed
these fears by offering ABA support only if OEO permitted existing
legal aid societies to receive government funding, allowed bar
representatives to have a role in governance, and respected traditional
norms of professionalism.252
Powell’s compromise made the
independent judgment of lawyers non-negotiable, and professional
autonomy became a hallmark of the ABA’s subsequent support for legal
services, even as the program confronted intense political backlash.253
Inherent contradictions in the understanding of the lawyer’s
professional role became evident. While the ABA insisted that lawyers
be able to exercise independent judgment, critics decried legal services
attorneys who pursued larger social agendas rather than subordinating
themselves to their clients’ immediate interests.254 There were proposals
to limit any class action litigation, legislative advocacy, or media
campaign that was not done at the specific behest of a low-income
client.255 Other reforms called for restrictions on lawsuits against
national, state, and local officials, suggesting that loyalty really ran to
the government (which at the federal level was paying the bills), rather
than to the poor.256 The ABA’s response was simple: legal services
250. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 72-75.
251. Id. at 69-71; JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 198 (2001); Abel,
Law Without Politics, supra note 14, at 499.
252. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 73-75; JEFFRIES, supra note 251, at 198-200.
253. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 224, 264; EARL JOHNSON, JR., 2 TO
ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL 353, 605-07 (2014).
254. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Myth and Reality at the Legal Services Corporation, in
ORRIN G. HATCH ET AL., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: THE ROBBER BARONS OF THE
POOR? 10 (1985) (‘[T]he program is not merely a means for providing legal counsel, but more
importantly a social movement. As a result, the goals of the movement take precedence over
the needs of individual clients . . . .”). As Scott Cummings notes, criticisms of activist
lawyers’ fidelity to clients came from the left as well as the right, even extending to the Inc.
Fund’s handling of desegregation litigation. Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn
in Law, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 3, 9 (2017).
255. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 130; JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 527-28, 557, 574,
638-39; EARL JOHNSON, JR., 3 TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL 739, 758 (2014); Abel, Law
Without Politics, supra note 14, at 531; William P. Quigley, Legal Services; The Demise of
Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation
from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241, 257 n.101, 261-64 (1998).
256. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 126, 233, 239-40; Quigley, supra note 255, at 258. See
generally Abel, Law Without Politics, supra note 14, at 528 (“[o]ne of the most puzzling
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attorneys must be free to represent low-income clients on the same terms
as those who served paying clients.257 But this response obscured
underlying ambiguities about the lawyer’s role. Some of these
uncertainties related to whether social trusteeship should figure at all in
the representation or whether lawyers should apply their expertise
narrowly to do their clients’ bidding. For those who did embrace social
trusteeship, there were doubts about how broadly it should be construed
and, in particular, whether it should encompass broad attacks on the
structural conditions of poverty as well as the particular hardships it
created for individual clients.
In part because of these ongoing uncertainties, the ABA could not
deflect a divisive struggle over the proper reach of legal services.258 At
the outset, the legal services program was part of a comprehensive effort
to eradicate poverty, and it seemed both logical and necessary that
attorneys would pursue fundamental change. Later, though, when OEO
was dismantled and legal services became an independent organization,
its mission shifted to access to justice.259 As then-President of the Legal
Services Corporation Thomas Ehrlich explained, “legal assistance for
the poor is no longer part of a war against poverty. Rather that assistance
is established as a basic right of citizenship.”260 Due to limited funding,
this right was framed as one of minimum access with an aspiration for
adequate or even equal access at some unspecified later date.261 That
hope was never realized; instead, there were perennial debates about
what the bare minimum of legal representation for indigent clients
required.262 The shift to an access to justice mission helped to cement a
view of the program as one designed to meet client needs, and legal aid
lawyers were banned from filing class actions to pursue broad-based
reforms.263 As a consequence, structural reform efforts had to find a
aspects of the state’s role in creating and administering legal aid is that often the state is the
adversary of legal aid recipients.”).
257. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 224; JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 605-07.
258. JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 442-46; Abel, Law Without Politics, supra note 14, at
547.
259. JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 467-70.
260. H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Departments of State, Justice,
Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Hearings on the Second Supplemental
Appropriations Bill, 1976, 94th Cong. 87 (1976) (testimony of Thomas Ehrlich, President,
Legal Services Corporation).
261. JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 469-70, 501-92; Abel, Law Without Politics, supra note
14, at 548; Quigley, supra note 255, at 257-61.
262. Edwin Meese, a high-ranking aide to President Ronald Reagan, offered one of the
most minimalist interpretations when he asserted that demand for legal services among the
poor could be met by relying entirely on law student volunteers. Abel, Law Without Politics,
supra note 14, at 548.
263. JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 737-40; SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN, supra note 28, at 15. See also Michael McCann and Jeffrey Dudas, Retrenchment
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home elsewhere in non-profit public interest law firms, small and solo
firms, large firm pro bono programs, and government practice. Each of
these practice environments influenced the nature of the lawyering:
Often, those workplaces with the most resources pursued the least
controversial cases, while those with the fewest resources struggled to
support more radical conceptions of reform.264 Increasing reliance on
pro bono services, which eventually outpaced legal aid in meeting the
needs of the poor, placed primary responsibility with private law firms
and so further instantiated a traditional model of lawyering.265
Innovations during the first two ages of modern American
lawyering proved quite durable, in part because they came to enjoy the
support of institutional elites. Changes wrought by the third age,
however, proved more vulnerable to retrenchment, in part because they
reflected the efforts of outsiders who were profoundly marginalized.
Attacks on legal aid began in earnest in the 1980s with the election of
President Ronald Reagan.266
His administration’s ideological
skirmishes were waged in the name of government downsizing and costcutting but often reflected a deep hostility to the redistributive
consequences of structural reform. As the organized bar sought to
assimilate legal services to conventional lawyering, the Reagan
Administration’s attacks on the program put the ABA on the defensive.
In 1987, Clark Durant, then chair of the Legal Services Corporation
board, created an uproar at an ABA mid-year meeting when he argued
that legal services funding should be zeroed out because the entire legal
profession needed to be restructured.267 In Durant’s view, the monopoly
on legal services had to be broken by lifting restrictions on the
unauthorized practice of law and by doing away with educational and
licensing requirements for lawyers.268 As he explained, “[t]he greatest
barrier to widely dispersed low-cost dispute resolution services for the
poor, and for all people, could very well be the laws protecting our

. . . and Resurgence? Mapping the Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the United
States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 37, 38 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds. 2006) (describing difficulties for cause lawyering that arose in the 1980s).
264. See Scott Barclay and Anna-Maria Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a
Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation
in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE 176-77 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds. 2005).
265. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
266. JOHNSON, supra note 253, at 505-08. Reagan’s animosity toward the legal services
program began when he was governor of California and repeatedly tried to eliminate
California Rural Legal Assistance in response to complaints from wealthy donors in
agribusiness. Id. at 121-38.
267. Id. at 615.
268. Id.
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profession.”269 To break up cartel-like practices, Durant urged “a private
sector deregulated legal profession” that would “encourage at every turn
the ability of entrepreneurs, para-professionals and lay people to be a
part of the delivery of legal services to the poor and for all people.”270
This open attack on the profession’s identity prompted a sharp rebuke
from the ABA, which called for Durant’s resignation as board chair.271
In contrast to populist reforms advocated during the Jacksonian era,
Durant’s proposals were the product of elite resistance to cause
lawyering. In the end, a combination of conservative political
ascendancy and powerful market forces took a toll on the alliance
between the practicing bar and progressive cause lawyers. According to
socio-legal scholars Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat,
As the broader political culture became more conservative after
1980, as the market for legal services became more competitive, and
as moral advocacy lost its luster for most young lawyers, the
profession’s receptivity to cause lawyering diminished. At the level
of the firm, . . . bottom-line concerns eroded support for cause
lawyering, with its tendency to eat into billable hours and sap the
energies of young associates. As for the organized profession, it
continued to call for vigorous pro bono programs and to support
government-funded legal services.272

Bar leaders’ exhortations at best produced mixed results. Legal
services suffered severe setbacks, and firms implemented their pro bono
programs in ways that deflected the most radical implications of cause
lawyering.273
Efforts to dismantle legal services represented a frontal assault on
cause lawyering. More subtle were efforts to appropriate lawyering
innovations to advance conservative causes. As legal scholar Ann
Southworth notes, “in the late 1960s, the public interest movement was
almost synonymous with left legal activism. . . .”274 By the 1970s,
however, right-wing legal groups had begun to emerge and found
themselves “at war” over goals and strategies; indeed, the infighting
prompted the conservative Heritage Foundation to intervene and counsel
cooperation.275 In the late 1970s, attorney Michael Horowitz obtained

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 616-18.
272. SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 28, at 44.
273. Id. at 44-45; see also Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause
Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF.
209, 222-25 (1998) (law firm culture can undermine the transformative potential of pro bono
practice).
274. ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT 32 (2008) (footnote omitted).
275. Id. at 31.
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funding to study conservative legal advocacy organizations. He found
that “what is at stake in public interest law is not so much a battle over
cases won and lost as of ideas and ideologies.”276 Horowitz concluded
that for right-wing legal organizations to become an authentic
movement, they had to demonstrate that “the real interests of America’s
poor and vulnerable inhere in such goals as abatement of inflation,
enhanced economic productivity, restraint on the power of government
and the courts, and growth of such ‘middle class’ values as the work
ethic, education, [and] effective criminal prosecution . . . .”277 To that
end, he urged these organizations to recruit talented young attorneys and
to abandon their narrow focus on litigation and amicus briefs. In
particular, he exhorted the groups to seek influence in the policy process,
both in the legislative and executive arenas.278 Ironically, these broad
tools for effecting social change were the very ones that the Reagan
administration had sought to strip from legal aid lawyers.
Reagan’s presidency ushered in a proliferation of conservative
advocacy groups, which enjoyed a newfound receptivity in the highest
circles of government.279 That growth continued into the 2000s.280
Though meant to appropriate the public interest rhetoric of the left, the
rise of conservative legal advocacy organizations also complicated
notions of professionalism. Legal scholars Stuart Scheingold and Austin
Sarat have argued that “[t]he place of cause lawyering in the profession
remain[ed] conditional and precarious” because it “directly assail[ed] the
profession’s core standard of ethical behavior, which weds lawyering to
political and moral neutrality and to technical competence.”281 The
emergence of robust conservative legal organizations arguably showed
that even the lawyering innovations of the civil rights movement could
be treated as a refinement of expertise in the service of clients’ interests.
With cause lawyers on both the left and the right, lawyering itself
remained a neutral concept—equally available to advance competing
ideologies. This neutrality in turn revealed the underlying incoherence
of social trustee professionalism as the notion of the public good became
fodder for an increasingly partisan adversarial process.282

276. Id. at 19 (citing Michael Horowitz, The Public Interest Law Movement: An Analysis
with Special Reference to the Role and Practices of Conservative Public Interest Law Firms
(1980)).
277. Id. at 19-20 (citing Horowitz, supra note 276).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 23-25.
280. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 274, at 29-30.
281. SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 28, at 23, 25.
282. Russell Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice, 29
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601, 608 (2016) (“In the 1960s, both the left and the right discredited
the possibility of disinterested expertise. They asserted that the public good did not exist. All
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C. Making It Real: Cause Lawyering and the Growth of Clinical
Education
The legal academy played a significant role in the third age of
modern American lawyering. The Inc. Fund had worked closely with
Howard Law School, especially its dean Charles Hamilton Houston, to
develop a litigation strategy that would dismantle the “separate but
equal” doctrine. Houston was a seminal figure who devised plans of
legal attack, mentored protégés to lead the effort, and designed a
curriculum to prepare graduates for the rigors of practice. As one of the
few black students at Harvard Law School, Houston used his experience
with the educational octopus to inform his deanship at Howard.283
African-Americans were largely barred from elite white law schools, but
Houston believed that historically black law schools with high
expectations and excellent training could prepare students for effective
advocacy on behalf of their communities.284 As he explained, “There are
enough white lawyers to care for the ordinary legal business of the
country if that were all that was involved. But experience has proved
that the average white lawyer, especially in the South, cannot be relied
upon to wage an uncompromising fight for equal rights for Negroes.”285
In the 1930s Houston worked to turn Howard Law School into a
challenging academic institution like Harvard. There would no longer
be a part-time night school, and the day program would raise admissions
standards, strengthen the curriculum, and make more demands on the
faculty.286 By 1950, Houston had achieved many of his ambitious goals
and was training a substantial portion of the black lawyers in the United
States. A number of these alumni worked as affiliates or employees of
the Inc. Fund.287 Thurgood Marshall, a Houston protégé who became a
was self-interest; pretentions to the public good only masked financial and political selfinterest.”).
283. Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown: The Development and Implementation
of the NAACP’s School Desegregation Campaign, 1930-1950, 52 MERCER L. REV. 631, 63536 (2001).
284. See generally J. Clay Smith, Toward a Houstonian Jurisprudence and the Study of
Pure Legal Existence—In Memoriam of Frank D. Reeves, 18 HOWARD L.J. 1 (1974)
(describing “Houstonian Jurisprudence”); Ware, supra note 283, at 636-38 (same).
285. Charles Hamilton Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49, 49
(1935).
286. Ware, supra note 283, at 635-36; Okianer Christian Dark, The Role of Howard
University School of Law in Brown v. Board of Education, 16 WASH. HIST. 83 (2004-05).
Indeed, some critics described Houston’s decision to close Howard’s part-time evening law
program as part of a misguided attempt to “Harvardize.” GENNA RAE MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK 74 (1983).
287. J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION 1844-1944 at 64 (1993); Dark, supra note 286,
at 84. Among the leading civil rights lawyers who challenged segregation at the Inc. Fund
were Howard Law School alumni Thurgood Marshall, Robert Carter, Spottswood W.
Robinson III, and George E.C. Hayes. Behring Center, Smithsonian National Museum of
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prominent civil rights litigator and a justice of the United States Supreme
Court, recalled: “When Brown against the Board of Education was being
argued in the Supreme Court . . . [t]here were some two dozen lawyers
on the side of the Negroes fighting for their schools . . . . [O]f those . . .
lawyers . . . only two hadn’t been touched by Charlie Houston. . . .”288
As part of the effort to elevate Howard, Houston asked law faculty
to lead by example. He recruited active civil rights practitioners who
brought their practical experience into the classroom. In Houston’s own
courses, he drew on materials from the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) as well as the NAACP so that students would understand the
challenges of broad-ranging reform advocacy.289 Designed to address
the needs of black lawyers, the curriculum reflected “a difference in
emphasis with more concentration on the subjects having direct
application to the economic, political and social problems of the
Negro.”290 In addition to a civil rights focus, Howard’s course offerings
relied on practical exercises to train students in everything from drafting
real estate documents to working in the criminal justice system.291 Top
students like Marshall even had opportunities to participate in cases that
the Inc. Fund was litigating.292 This intensive hands-on instruction was
designed to enable Howard Law alumni to overcome limited
opportunities for professional development as well as the pitfalls of
discrimination.
Innovation associated with the third age of modern American
lawyering led to lasting change with the growth of clinical education.293
Demands for more practical training in law school were hardly new. In
1928, Alfred Z. Reed recommended such courses to little avail.294
During the New Deal, Jerome Frank pressed for real-life legal
laboratories, but his efforts also gained little traction.295 In fact, by 1951
there were only twenty-eight law school clinics in the United States.296
American History, Separate Is Not Equal: Brown v. Board of Education—The Challenges of
Segregation, http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/5-decision/challengers.html.
288. MCNEIL, supra note 286, at 3 (citing College Honors Charles Houston ‘15,
AMHERST MAG., Spring 1978, at 12, 14).
289. Robert K. Poch, Shaping Freedom’s Course: Charles Hamilton Houston, Howard
University, and Legal Instruction on U.S. Civil Rights, 39 AM. EDUC. HIST. J. 417, 421 (2012).
Eventually, Houston left Howard to become part of the Inc. Fund’s litigation team, though he
did not live to see the victory in Brown. Id. at 417. See generally RAWN JAMES, JR., ROOT
AND BRANCH 47-58 (2010) (describing Houston’s influence on Marshall).
290. Houston, supra note 285, at 51.
291. Poch, supra note 289, at 422-24.
292. Id. at 426-27.
293. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 441-42.
294. Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada,
Bulletin No. 21, at 215-21 (1928).
295. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
296. Quintin Johnstone, Law School Legal Aid Clinics, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535 (1951).
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From the outset, the rationale for experiential learning was far from
monolithic. Reed had envisioned a two-track system that relegated the
practically trained to mundane careers. Clinics would promote the
mastery of expertise that could be sold on the market; there was no
notion that skills training should advance social change. By contrast,
“for the greats of Realism, practical training was primarily for the
purpose of deepening theoretical understanding.” 297 Realists believed
that students need[ed] to be exposed to the ‘law in action’ in order to
become sensitive to the impact of the law on the world and the impact of
the world on law, so that they would reflect on their own future roles and
not view law as a self-contained ‘science’ divorced from reality.” 298
Reflecting an expansive concept of social trustee professionalism,
clinics would teach students that “an important part of their future task
is to press for improvements of the judicial process and for social and
economic changes through legislation, and wise administration . . . .”299
With a strong social justice focus, the model of clinical education
that initially emerged during the third age of modern American
lawyering owed more to the Realists’ vision than Reed’s.300 Early on,
the OEO itself had recognized the potential for legal educators to become
partners in the War on Poverty. Officials sought funding to link legal
aid attorneys to law schools so that advocacy for the poor could be
supported by high-quality research and well-trained attorneys.301 This
partnership was never realized; instead, some post-graduate fellowships
were created to encourage young lawyers to work for legal services.302
Even a grant to support the Harvard Legal Services Institute, a single
initiative at a single law school, met with withering criticism and federal
funding was terminated.303
Without public funding, law school clinics relied on private seed
money from the Ford Foundation to expand. Ford appointed William
Pincus to head the Council on Legal Education for Professional

297. George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 162, 171 (1974).
298. Id.
299. Frank, supra note 207, at 922.
300. Grossman, supra note 297, at 173-74; Dennis E. Curtis, Educating Lawyers: Clinical
Programs and the Legal Profession, Remarks to the Conference on Clinical Education in the
World, Waseda Law School, Sept. 9, 2006, at 12-13; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 577.
301. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 198 (describing 1969 National Justice Foundation
proposal).
302. The Reginald Heber Smith Fellows (or “Reggies”) program was created in 1966-67
and lasted for 16 years. During that time, it trained 2,300 poverty lawyers. Id. at 118-20, 14849.
303. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 492-93.
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Responsibility (CLEPR), a post he held from 1968 to 1981.304 These
efforts were transformative: By the early 1970s half of all American law
schools had at least one clinical program.305 In explaining this dramatic
shift, Pincus described himself as “a child of the Roosevelt era”306 who
recognized the importance of a new era of social activism. In his view,
“[t]he outside forces which helped CLEPR’s program and served also to
open the law schools to change included the black man’s fight for
advancement; various kinds of student action; and the legal services
programs which came as a result of the war on poverty.”307 He believed
that “[l]aw student unrest in the late 60’s, . . . minor as it was compared
to the other student unrest, found the law faculties shaky enough to be
ready to make some concessions.”308 As a result, law school clinics
emerged from “a marriage of convenience between law schools, a
vanguard of law students and young law professors, and CLEPR.”309
Pincus was not always entirely comfortable with the union. When
invited to be part of a discussion on “Young Lawyers and the Legal
Revolution,” he remarked that “I doubt that what we at the Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility are trying to bring about
can be termed a revolution. We are trying to reform the law school
curriculum. . . .”310
In its early years, CLEPR “justified clinical education in terms of
community service.”311 This orientation led to concerns that the
educational mission was being shortchanged.312 In a May 1971 report,
CLEPR acknowledged the tensions:
It was felt that if clinical programs continue to restrict themselves to
small numbers of students, they are likely to court the disapproval of
the outside world particularly as they involve themselves in highly
sensitive cases. If the entire student body of the law school is

304. J.P. “Sandy” Ogilvy, William Pincus: A Life in Service—Government, Philanthropy
& Legal Education, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 8, 10 (2015). In the late 1950s and 1960s, Pincus
worked on two projects that laid the foundation for CLEPR: the National Council on Legal
Clinics and the Council on Education for Professional Responsibility. Id. at 36-37, 42-45.
305. William Pincus, The President’s Report, in WILLIAM PINCUS, CLINICAL EDUCATION
FOR LAW STUDENTS 27-28 (1980); William Pincus, To Make Legal Education More
Practical, in PINCUS, supra at 117, 118; William Pincus, Concepts of Justice and of Legal
Education Today, in PINCUS, supra at 125, 132; William Pincus, Changing Today’s Law
Schools, in PINCUS, supra at 181-82; William Pincus, Clinical Legal Education in the United
States, 1968-1975, in PINCUS, supra at 343-44. See generally STEVENS, supra note 42, at
215-16; Spencer, supra note 80, at 2004-05.
306. Ogilvy, supra note 304, at 35 (citing June 7, 2000 interview with William Pincus).
307. Pincus, Changing Today’s Law Schools, in PINCUS, supra note 305, at 188.
308. Pincus, Legal Clinics in Law Schools, in PINCUS, supra note 305, at 249.
309. Id. at 241, 249-50.
310. Pincus, To Make Legal Education More Practical, in PINCUS, supra note 305, at 117.
311. Grossman, supra note 297, at 174.
312. Id. at 176.
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involved, then descriptions in terms of ‘educational’ rather than
‘agitational’ are more likely to be applied.313

These tensions led to competing approaches—ranging from
partnerships with legal aid offices and live-client clinics that fulfilled a
social justice mission to field placements and simulations that focused
on skills training as preparation for practice.314
The conflict eventually was resolved largely in favor of skills
training. By 1974, George S. Grossman, who conducted research on
clinical programs for CLEPR, concluded that “[a] new consensus is
emerging, basing the rationale of the clinical method not on service, not
on law reform, not on research results, but on education.”315 The
personal experience of clinicians confirmed this shift. Professors Philip
G. Schrag and Michael Meltsner arrived at Columbia Law School as
clinics were being “born in the social ferment of the 1960s.”316 Initially,
their clinical offerings were designed to address questions of social
justice but as the civil rights and antiwar protests of an earlier era faded
into distant memories, students were “quite content with the view that
social issues—particularly questions of income and wealth
distribution—are personal concerns, unrelated to their career decisions
within the profession. . . .”317 In response, their clinics gradually came
to focus on skills training, and Schrag and Meltsner dropped subjects
like criminal justice reform, campaign practices, and immigration,
instead creating simulations that were more manageable and easier to
teach. 318 The changes eventually aligned clinical instruction more
closely with traditional notions of lawyering. As Schrag and Meltsner
explain, “[t]he comparative neutrality of our present role tend[ed] to
convey an approval of good lawyering divorced from its social
impact. . . .”319 Despite this shift, they still believed that their pioneering
efforts made “[l]aw schools . . . generally more hospitable places for
313. Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Clinical Education—
What Is It? Where Are We? Where Do We Go From Here?, 16 STUDENT L.J. 16, 17 (May
1971).
314. George Grossman, supra note 297, at 173-81, 184-86.
315. Id. at 186.
316. PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL EDUCATION
3 (1998).
317. Id. at 16.
318. Id. at 10, 56-58. For a description of the competing theories underlying clinical
education as well as an account of the strong orientation toward structural reform and social
justice among pioneering clinicians like Gary Bellow, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555, 570-71
(1980). In the midst of the debates over clinical education, a seminal 1977 text by David
Binder and Susan Price helped to cement a shift from live-client clinics towards other forms
of skills training. Robert D. Dinerstein, Review Essay: Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 697. 698, 700 (1992).
319. SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 316, at 57-58.
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teachers and students interested in law reform and social service than
they were when we started teaching more than twenty-five years ago.”320
Just as the third age’s innovation of cause lawyering proved
unstable and subject to retrenchment, so too did clinical education with
a social justice orientation. According to legal scholar William Simon,
as skills training became narrowly focused on the client’s interests, it
was shorn of historical and social context. This seeming neutrality
cultivated “a sense of apolitical moral engagement” that celebrates “an
ahistorical and apolitical conception of human nature.”321 More
recently, clinician Sameer Ashar has voiced similar concerns about the
lost democratic promise of clinical education.322 In his view, even liveclient clinics now rely heavily on an individual case-centered model,
which reinforces conventional practice norms.323 Ashar believes that
law schools have come to privilege pedagogy over social justice by
marginalizing community-based, progressive lawyering.324 With the
latest economic downturn in the legal market, he argues, there are
increasing pressures to prepare students for traditional legal careers. 325
As a result, clinical lawyering for social justice has been forced to cede
even more curricular space to practical training.326 Rather than
transforming the traditional curriculum, then, clinical education has
itself been assimilated to conventional pedagogies.
D. Desegregation, Affirmative Action, and the Compromised Pedagogy
of Diversity
Calls for social justice in law schools affected not just the
curriculum but the composition of the student body: women and people
of color enrolled in unprecedented numbers beginning in the late 1960s
and 1970s. As early as 1938, NAACP lawyers had successfully
challenged policies that excluded blacks from public law schools.327 In
Sweatt v. Painter,328 decided just a few years before Brown, the Supreme
320. Id. at 315.
321. William Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes for a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 487, 554 (1980).
322. Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic Lawyering in Clinical Practice,
104 CAL. L REV. 201, 204-05, 208-12 (2016); Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective
Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2008).
323. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, supra note 322, at 357-58, 368-71.
324. Id. at 389-97; Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1078 (2007).
325. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic Lawyering in Clinical Practice, supra note
322, at 208-09.
326. Id. at 112-14.
327. Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Can., 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (program that paid black
students to attend a law school in another state violated equal protection).
328. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Court struck down Texas’s establishment of a separate and clearly
inferior law school for African-American students. At the time that
Sweatt was decided, African Americans accounted for only about .65
percent of the legal profession, and segregation was the norm, not the
exception, in legal education.329 The opinion in Sweatt acknowledged
these stark realities, noting that “[t]he law school, the proving ground for
legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.”330
Despite the victory in Sweatt, law schools remained
overwhelmingly white until the late 1960s.331 In the 1964-65 academic
year, for example, only 1.3 percent of law students were AfricanAmerican, and that figure fell to less than one percent after excluding
students enrolled at historically black institutions.332 The data for
Latinos is sketchier; however, research suggests that by 1969, fewer than
.006 percent of all law students were part of an “amorphous category
entitled Spanish American, which includes all Spanish surnames and
Spanish speaking groups.”333 The statistics on Native Americans are
similarly scant, but in 1968, there were no more than twenty-five Native
American attorneys in the United States.334 In part, this slow progress
reflected a philosophy of gradualism in implementing desegregation. In
1955, for example, the AALS rejected the Committee on Racial
Discrimination’s recommendation that law schools refrain from
discriminating against black applicants or lose their membership.335
AALS leaders concluded that “any coercive measures would delay
further racial integration in the schools by aggravating present
resentment and resistance” and therefore “[t]he wisest course . . . is for
the Association to continue to serve in the role of mediator . . . .”336
The rise of cause lawyering made plain the gap between the
identities of lawyers and members of the communities that they served.
When the War on Poverty was launched, the scarcity of lawyers of color
was so acute that officials at OEO’s legal services program worried
about “funding a nearly all-white program.”337 To address that concern,
329. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of
African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 6 (2003).
330. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
331. Kidder, supra note 329, at 4-10.
332. Id. at 6-7.
333. Cruz Reynoso et al., La Raza, the Law, and the Law Schools, 2 U. TOL. L. REV. 809,
839 (1970).
334. Kidder, supra note 329, at 8.
335. Maurice T. Van Hecke, Racial Desegregation in the Law Schools, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC.
283, 283 (1956).
336. Id. at 288.
337. JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 188.
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OEO lawyers helped to launch the Council on Legal Educational
Opportunity (CLEO), an initiative of the ABA, the AALS, and the
historically black National Bar Association. Funded by the Ford
Foundation, CLEO was a pipeline program designed to help talented
students of color pursue law degrees.338 Affirmative action programs,
created in response to riots in 1967 and 1968 that followed the
assassination of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,339
produced substantial gains in law school enrollment for blacks, Latinos,
and Native Americans, especially in the 1970s.340 During that period,
women also entered law schools in unparalleled numbers, despite some
initial resistance.341 In 1965, female students made up four percent of
enrollments, but by 1980, they accounted for thirty-six percent of all law
students.342
With this remarkable demographic shift, some legal educators
anticipated that diversity itself would transform classroom dynamics so
that questions of inequality and inclusion could come to the fore. That
notion had figured in Sweatt’s assertion that law schools were less
effective when isolated from the communities they serve. A similar
philosophy influenced the United States Supreme Court’s endorsement
of affirmative action programs in 1978 in Bakke v. Regents of the
University of California.343 There, Justice Lewis Powell emphasized
that student body diversity was critical to promote “the robust exchange
of ideas.”344 In 2003, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this
view in Grutter v. Bollinger,345 when it upheld the consideration of race
and ethnicity in admissions at the University of Michigan Law School.
The Court saw elite law schools as pathways to influence that must be
open to people from all walks of life. A diverse student body would

338. Id. at 188-92.
339. Kidder, supra note 329, at 12.
340. Id. at 13. For a thorough description of changes in diversity at one American law
school during this period, see MIGUEL ESPINOZA, THE INTEGRATION OF THE UCLA SCHOOL
OF LAW, 1966-1978: ARCHITECTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2018).
341. Kidder, supra note 329, at 15-17. Some law schools had quotas for female students,
and women were not admitted to all accredited law schools until 1972. Deborah L. Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1173-74 (1988). Acceptance
of women could be grudging. When Harvard admitted its first women law students in 1950,
Dean Erwin Griswold reportedly greeted the incoming class by saying “Enjoy your stay at
Harvard Law School, and as for the women in the class, personally, I didn’t favor your
admission, but since you are here, welcome.” John Anderson, Admission Denied, AM. LAW.,
Mar. 1999, at 118, 119.
342. OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, ABA AND LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL 808 (Wendy Margolis et al. eds. 2001). By 2000, women had achieved
parity in law school enrollments. Id.
343. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., majority).
344. Id. at 312 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
345. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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enrich the intellectual environment by better preparing all students to
serve clients, understand the profession’s public-regarding obligations,
and assume leadership roles in a multicultural society.346 In 2016, in
Fisher v. Texas, the justices again embraced a pedagogy of diversity as
a justification for affirmative action.347
Despite the Court’s pronouncements, survey research and anecdotal
evidence suggest that members of underrepresented racial and ethnic
groups often are marginalized in classes that elevate technical doctrine
over values rooted in personal experience. As legal scholar Elizabeth
Mertz found in her study of first-year Contracts classes, the case
method’s dominance has led to a “constant filtering of conflict stories
through the lens of legal-textual authority” and has taught students to
acquiesce in the ways that legal discourse “operate[s] to reinforce social
inequality, while essentially hiding its own tracks.”348 Even today, the
Langdellian method socializes law students to treat as unnameable or at
least irrelevant the very differences that diversity is designed to
illuminate.
Women and people of color often feel alienated by the law school
curriculum, as demonstrated by consistent findings that they are less
likely to speak in class than their white male peers.349 Researchers
attribute these differences not only to traditional teaching methods in the
first-year curriculum but also a significant lack of diversity on law school
faculties and in the student body.350 Typically, only a handful of upperdivision electives concentrate on the unique experiences of women and
people of color, while the rest of the curriculum remains largely free of

346. Id. at 328-33.
347. Fisher v. Texas (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-18 (2013); Fisher v. Texas (Fisher
II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210-11 (2016) (Fisher II).
348. MERTZ, supra note 78, at 94, 98 (2007); see also ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING
ELITE LAWYERS 52-65 (1992) (students shift from idealism to cynicism because of the firstyear curriculum’s gamesmanship).
349. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Kenneth B. Nunn, & Jane E. Pendergast, Diversity
Matters: Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11,
22, 23, 26, 34 (2003); LANI GUINIER, ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN 43 (1997); Suzanne
Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law
School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 28-29 (1990); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The
Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1335 (1988). But cf. Gender,
Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and
Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1242-43 (1988) (women participated less in class than
men, but this pattern did not affect their satisfaction with or performance in law school). See
generally Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for
Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 16-32 (1998) (reviewing studies on race and gender
in the classroom).
350. See, e.g., GUINIER ET AL., supra note 349, at 48, 49-51, 53-54, 58-62; Dowd, Nunn,
and Pendergast, supra note 349, at 30-33, 36-39; Mertz et al., supra note 349, at 3-4; Homer
& Schwartz, supra note 349, at 37-38, 45.
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discussions of race and gender.351 Despite these shortcomings, law
students overwhelmingly endorse the value of diversity in legal
education. In a study done at Harvard and Michigan shortly before the
Grutter decision, education scholars Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla
reported that approximately eighty percent of surveyed law students
supported strengthening or maintaining admissions policies to promote
inclusion of underrepresented minorities.352 Students reported that
contact with people of different races and ethnicities enhanced their
ability to work in interracial settings, improved the educational
experience, and prompted them to rethink their values and perspectives
on issues like civil rights and criminal justice.353
The third age of modern American lawyering once again failed to
grapple with the implications for social trusteeship of a major innovation
in practice, cause lawyering. The bar wanted to preserve a unified
image, but this time, the threat came from newly prominent black
lawyers who had once been barred from joining the ABA. Their
segregated status was undeniable proof of the profession’s stratification,
and this reality was harder to deflect through largely rhetorical
commitments to social trusteeship. Initially, the NAACP’s law-centric
credo offered at least some common ground—all could agree that
technical mastery was essential to consummate lawyering. Yet, even
this shared understanding rooted in expert professionalism was
destabilized by activists who insisted on political mobilization as a vital
tool for reform. To restore some tenuous sense of professional solidarity,
the bar turned to legal aid services and demanded that attorneys
representing the poor enjoy the same autonomy as those serving paying
clients. This move helped to legitimate a conventional model of legal
service delivery, even as federal officials stripped legal aid attorneys of
their most compelling techniques for effecting social change. The
emphasis was on deploying expertise to serve client interests, while
obligations to serve the greater good remained peripheral and ill-defined.
Conventional notions of mastery and expertise also worked to
temper the impact of cause lawyering on American law schools. Clinical
education was adapted to provide practical skills training, rather than to
promote a social justice mission. Similarly, diversity became a means
to prepare students to represent clients and deal with colleagues in a
multicultural society, not an opportunity to reassess the social and ethical
obligations of a changed profession. In short, expert professionalism
351. Faisal Bhabha, Toward a Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education, 52 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 59, 86-90 (2014).
352. Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences
in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED 147 (G. Orfield ed. 2001).
353. Id. at 155-67.
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continued to anchor the bar’s unified identity and to tether the evolution
of social trustee professionalism. These repeated failures to elaborate
the public-regarding aspects of law set the stage for the current crisis in
the legal profession and legal education, one marked by fears of
destructive market forces and declining aspirational ideals.
IV. THE CURRENT CRISIS: ARE WE ENTERING THE FOURTH AGE OF
MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING?
As the social activism of the 1960s and 1970s receded and anxieties
about commercialism grew, an elegiacal literature on the decline of law
as a public-regarding profession—always with at least some hope of
redemption—began to appear. In his 1993 book The Lost Lawyer,
former Yale Law School dean Anthony T. Kronman described a crisis
of morale due to “the demise of an older set of values that until quite
recently played a vital role in defining the aspirations of American
lawyers. At the very center of these values was the belief that the
outstanding lawyer—the one who serves as a model for the rest—is not
simply an accomplished technician but a person of prudence or practical
wisdom as well.”354 In a similar vein, Robert MacCrate, a New York
law firm partner and a strong proponent of skills training, decried
pressures to commercialize practice, wondering whether “there is a place
for a profession of law in what has been called, since the 1980s, the ‘legal
services industry.’ ” 355 Both Kronman and MacCrate concluded that
economic restructuring, particularly in large law firms, had made it
harder for attorneys to live up to aspirations of service.356 Each believed
that legal education could play a pivotal role in restoring norms of social
trustee professionalism.357 Even so, Kronman struck a deeply
pessimistic note, concluding that “the likelihood that the profession as a
whole will awaken to the emptiness of its condition and there will be a
great resurgence of support, at an institutional level, for the vanishing
ideal of the lawyer-statesman seems . . . quite low.”358

354. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 2 (1993). The invocation of “an older
set of values” could be nostalgic. Worries about lost virtue and commercialized law practice
have plagued large law firms since their inception. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The
Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REV. 905, 908 (1994).
355. Robert MacCrate, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Building the Continuum of
Legal Education and Professional Development, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 805, 812 (2004).
356. Id. at 813-14; KRONMAN, supra note 354, at 273-307.
357. See MacCrate, supra note 355, at 812-15, 821-24; KRONMAN, supra note 354, at
269-70.
358. KRONMAN, supra note 354, at 380.
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A. A Profession Under Stress and the Prospect of a Fourth Age of
Modern American Lawyering
The contemporary crisis confronting the legal profession and legal
education seems to confirm this gloomy assessment. When the
American Lawyer began to track “profits per partner” in large firms in
1985, it reinforced perceptions of corporate attorneys as locked in a
ruthless race for revenue. 359 The large firm mantra that “law is a
business” has intensified as powerful corporate clients demand costcutting measures and take legal work in-house to save money.360 In this
highly competitive environment, there are concerns that large law firms
will shirk their social obligations, including pro bono work.361
Meanwhile, faced with narrowing profit margins, solo and small-firm
practitioners also find it increasingly difficult to provide service to the
needy.362 Even public interest attorneys, confronted with funding cuts
and constraints on their discretion, have sometimes come to view publicregarding obligations as inhering not in their work but in their selfsacrificing personal characters.363
As a result of these market changes, the organized bar has been
grappling with intensifying stratification and fragmentation among
practicing lawyers. Between 1967 and 2010, the earnings gap between
a law partner and a solo practitioner nearly tripled, according to Internal
Revenue Service data on lawyer earnings.364 As large firm partners
reaped unprecedented financial rewards, attorneys in public interest
often earned incomes akin to those of social workers.365 Stratification
359. See BARTON, supra note 29, at 62-63, 70-71; MILTON REGAN & LISA ROHRER, LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, A FRAGILE BALANCE: BUSINESS, PROFESSION, AND
CULTURE IN THE LARGE LAW FIRM 14-17 (Oct. 2015); Dan Lear, “I Hate to Break it to You
Lawyers, But Law Is a Business,” 5(3) GP SOLO EREPORT (Oct. 2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2015/lawyers_law_is_business.ht
ml.
360. BARTON, supra note 29, at 71-72.
361. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 54 (2015) (describing buyout option for pro bono service); Douglas Thomson, Negotiating Cause Lawyering Potential
in the Early Years of Corporate Practice, in THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE,
274, 293-97 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds. 2005) (law firms constrain pro bono
practice and use it to reap benefits in training, reputation, and visibility).
362. See BARTON, supra note 29, at 102, 121-29; Heinz, Nelson, and Laumann, supra
note 43, at 339-42.
363. See Lynn C. Jones, Exploring the Sources of Cause and Career Correspondence
Among Cause Lawyers, in THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE 203, 219-20, 223-24
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005) (describing tensions between professional
identity and activist identity for cause lawyers).
364. BARTON, supra note 29, at 47.
365. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training, and Placing Public
Interest Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2002); Ann Southworth, Our
Fragmented Profession, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 431, 433-34 (2017); Jennifer Smith,
Lawyer Salary Update: Class Warfare Edition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2012; Huge Gap
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led to fragmentation: lawyers in corporate firms rarely interacted with
attorneys in other sectors of practice. Instead, BigLaw attorneys mainly
dealt with business clients and other corporate lawyers from around the
world.366 Although the organized bar remains committed to a unified
image of the profession, fragmentation has affected practitioners’
willingness to commit time and energy to any professional
organization.367 ABA membership has steadily declined, 368 and niche
bar associations now cater to the interests of particular constituencies.369
Cause lawyers often see the National Lawyers Guild as more relevant to
their professional lives,370 and government lawyers have created their
own organizations.371 With growing diversity, identity-based bar
associations have proliferated as well.372 As a result, any unified notion
of professional identity is under considerable strain.373
Remains Between Public Interest and Law Firm Attorney Salaries, NALP Reports, NAT.
JURIST, Sept. 15, 2010; Philip G. Schrag, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Inaugural Lecture of
the Delaney Family Professorship: Why Would Anyone Want to Be a Public Interest Lawyer?
(Sept. 23, 2009), at 2.
366. See BARTON, supra note 29, at 173-76.
367. See Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: A Case Study of
Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in CAUSE LAWYERING 139-40 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice]
(time constraints prevent lawyers in public interest and public service from participating in
professional organizations); Leigh McMullan Abramson, Making One of the Most Brutal Jobs
a Little Less Brutal, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 10, 2015 (heavy workloads in large firms mean a
lack of time for other activities).
368. Southworth, supra note 365, at 436 (only twenty-seven percent of lawyers currently
are members of the ABA). Low membership in the ABA is not a new issue. When the
organization was formed, it was designed to serve elite attorneys, and only about eighteen
percent of all lawyers had joined by 1930. Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the
Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1,
8. Today, however, membership shortfalls threaten the ABA’s bottom line. The Treasurer’s
Report for the fiscal year ending August 31, 2015 found decreases in membership dues that
were not offset by efforts to expand revenue from other sources. ABA Treasurer’s Report,
A.B.A. J. 21 (May 2016).
369. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS AND JOANNA MARTIN, TORT REFORM, PLAINTIFFS’
LAWYERS, AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 72, 87-95 (2015) (need for and formation of special
organizations to serve plaintiffs’ attorneys in Texas).
370. Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice, supra note 367, at 139-41.
371. See, e.g., National District Attorneys Association, www.ndaajustice.org; National
Association for Public Defense, www.publicdefenders.us; National Legal Aid & Defender
Association, www.nlada.org.
372. See, e.g., National Bar Association, https://www.nationalbar.org; Hispanic National
Bar Association, hnba.com; National Asian Pacific American Bar Association,
www.napaba.org; National Association of Women Lawyers, www.nawl.org; see generally
Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 273, at 242 (growing fragmentation of progressive lawyers
due to the rise of bar associations focused on women and minorities). Sociologist Steven
Brint has argued that the values that professionals express have grown less cohesive with
increased demographic diversity and the proliferation of public and non-profit as well as forprofit practice settings. BRINT, supra note 10, at 95-103.
373. There have been challenges to the very concept of a unified bar with mandatory
membership for all lawyers practicing in a state. See Dan Kittay, Unified Bar Update: Recent
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Moreover, new ways of dispersing knowledge have left attorneys
vulnerable to the perils of commoditization. Lay people today can locate
legal information, including cases, statutes, regulations, and legal forms,
that once might have seemed beyond their reach.374 Growing dispersion
of knowledge has led to increased interest in licensing non-lawyers and
relying on software algorithms to perform routine legal tasks.375 As
these technologies become more sophisticated, legal disputes
increasingly can be resolved in virtual settings that displace the
traditional forums that lawyers once monopolized.376 Dramatically
expanded access to information and the rise of non-lawyer lawyering
make claims of professionalism based on exclusive access to expertise
increasingly difficult to sustain.377
Forces of stratification and fragmentation also are at work in legal
education. Emphasizing the commodification of expertise, scholars
today debate whether a law degree is a good investment based on present
costs and projected lifetime earnings.378 With the focus on a degree’s
financial yield, students have come to conclude that getting a lucrative
law firm job is the sine qua non of legal education. Those at top schools
reap the rewards of BigLaw, while others struggle to pay off their
debts.379 In this “winner takes all” environment, there is little, if any,
Challenges, Including ‘Teeth Whitening’ and Legal Zoom Cases, 39 BAR LEADER (July/Aug.
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/201415/july-august/unified-bar-update-recent-challenges-including-teeth-whitening-legalzoomcases.html. As the concept of a unified bar has come under attack, a 2015 United States
Supreme Court decision prompted new concerns by holding that a state dental board’s efforts
to exclude non-dentists from the market for teeth whitening constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade. N. C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101
(2015). Shortly thereafter, LegalZoom filed suit in North Carolina to establish that the state
bar could not prohibit it from offering prepaid legal services plans. Complaint for Damages
and Injunctive Relief at 3-7, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 1:15-CV439 (D.N.C. June 3, 2015).
374. BARTON, supra note 29, at 88-97; RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 4344 (2013); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?, 121-30 (2010).
375. BARTON, supra note 29, at 235; SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, supra note
374, at 49; Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of
Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2630-33 (2014). So far, efforts to regulate these
practices based on restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law have met with limited
success. Deborah L. Rhode, White Paper: What We Know and Need to Know About the
Delivery of Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 67 S.C. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (2016) (describing
setbacks for bar association challenges at the state and federal level).
376. SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, supra note 374, at 99-102; SUSSKIND, THE
END OF LAWYERS?, supra note 374, at 17-24.
377. See Ellen M. Harshman et al., Professional Ethics in a Virtual World: The Impact of
the Internet on Traditional Notions of Professionalism, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 227, 229-32 (2005).
378. See, e.g., Michael J. Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 259, 272-76, 280, 284-85 (2014); Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Debating Yet Again, the Worth of Law School, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013, 11:44 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/debating-yet-again-the-worth-of-law-school/.
379. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 140-43.
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room for students to contemplate public-regarding obligations.380 Much
as in law practice, dedication to the greater good is treated not as a
professional duty but as a personal preference, which students must selffinance by acquiring large amounts of student debt.381
The profound question facing today’s lawyers and legal educators
is whether these patterns of intensifying fragmentation and stratification
within the profession will augur a fourth age of modern American
lawyering. If so, this age will stand in marked contrast to its
predecessors. The three prior ages of American lawyering were marked
by relentless growth as new forms of practice emerged in response to
dynamic social conditions. Today, however, the focus is on how law
practice will shrink and who will be left behind.382 In earlier ages,
attorneys themselves were the primary drivers of innovations in
corporate, government, and cause lawyering, but today, many of the
pressures for change come from without. Lawyers no longer seem to be
fully in control of their destinies as technology companies offer services
that threaten private practice and politicians push for deregulation that
limits the need for government practice.383 Now, when firms like
Dentons, DLA Piper, and Latham and Watkins invest in an artificial
intelligence platform to bring down legal costs, it is not clear whether
this is a reactive or proactive move.384 These firms may be mobilizing
because they fear that others are already developing similar technologies

380. Garth, supra note 29, at 529-30. Recent empirical evidence suggests that legal
education promotes a shift from intrinsic motivation to extrinsic rewards, contributing to
heightened levels of dissatisfaction in both law school and law practice. Lawrence S. Krieger
& Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven Prescription to
Redefine Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 566-69, 623-25 (2015).
381. See Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a
Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School 2-3, 5, 7-9, 15-17 (Dec. 2007),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/field/files/field_nyu_13108-1.pdf?m=1360040259
(describing different levels of commitment to public interest careers between students who
received fee waivers and students who received equivalent loan forgiveness). Though loan
forgiveness programs mitigate the financial burden, graduates run the risk that terms will be
modified or plans eliminated before they can take advantage of them. Public Service Loan
Forgiveness: Questions and Answers for Federal Student Loan Borrowers, FED. STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgivenesscommon-questions.pdf; Shannon Najmabadi, A Year Before Public-Service Loan Forgiveness
Kicks In, Uncertainty Looms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 18, 2016.
382. BARTON, supra note 29, at 51-54.
383. Id. at 85-86, 120.
384. Debra Cassens Weiss, DLA Piper to Use Artificial Intelligence for M & A Document
Review, A.B.A. J. (June 15, 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/dla_piper_to_use_artificial_intelligence_technolog
y_for_ma_document_review; Debra Cassens Weiss, Will Newbie Associates Be Replaced by
Watson? 35% of Law Firm Leaders Can Envision It, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/will_associates_be_replaced_by_watson_computin
g_35_percent_of_law_firm_lead/.
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or they could be seeking to chart their own futures. Or, it could be a little
of both.
B. The Future of Professionalism in an Uncertain World
With all of these strains on the legal profession, the rhetoric of crisis
has become commonplace, though as some have noted, the term “crisis”
has been overused in discussing the future of law and lawyers.385 Even
so, two major challenges to traditional notions of professionalism have
been born of this sense of crisis. One is a call to ballast professionalism
altogether. Law professor Thomas D. Morgan has concluded that the
“use of the idea of a ‘profession’ to understand the world of lawyers
obstructs clear thinking about what lawyers actually do and how they are
likely to have to respond to the world they face.”386 In his view, social
trusteeship is irrelevant because praiseworthy moral conduct should be
attributed not to professional identity but to personal character.387 As for
expert professionalism, Morgan acknowledges that lawyers possess
valuable knowledge and skills, but he concludes that this merely makes
them “economic actors, specially trained, but driven by all of the vices—
and virtues—of a capitalist economic system.”388 As a result, he finds
that neither public obligation nor technical expertise justifies
professional status.
Legal scholar Russell Pearce reaches conclusions similar to
Morgan’s. Because traditional concepts of professionalism cannot be
reconciled with the idea that law is a business, Pearce searches for a
Middle Range approach that “would permit the community of legal
service providers to develop a moral aspiration for their work consistent
with the commercial context of law practice and free of the perceived
hypocrisy of the Professionalism Paradigm.” 389 Under his approach, the
organized bar would continue to certify lawyers’ credentials, but this
would not lead to an exclusive license to provide legal services.390 With
both lawyers and non-lawyers permitted to deliver legal advice, Pearce
believes that there would be more vigorous efforts to protect consumers

385. Abel, You Never Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste, supra note 29, at 3-4, 5, 16;
Garth, supra note 29, at 504-09.
386. MORGAN, supra note 30, at 20 (footnote omitted). See also Russell G. Pearce,
Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the
Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1269-76 (1995) (a “Middle
Range approach” that combines an acknowledgment of the market-based nature of law
practice with an aspirational, communitarian vision would be superior to the current
“Professionalism Paradigm”).
387. MORGAN, supra note 30, at 22, 69.
388. Id. at 25.
389. Pearce, supra note 30, at 1270.
390. Id. at 1269.
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than is currently the case.391 In addition, competition from non-lawyers
could enhance the quality of legal services for low- and middle-income
persons.392 Finally, by overcoming the cynicism generated by
contradictory notions of professionalism, Pearce contends that legal
service providers would be free to have a meaningful dialogue about
developing a community ethic of service.393 Like Morgan, Pearce hopes
that upending archaic conventions will “provide[] the legal community
with the opportunity to turn from lamenting the decline of
professionalism to the more important work of improving the delivery
of legal services and promoting justice.”394
Still other scholars call for the legal profession to dispense with its
unified image and openly recognize its deeply divided nature. These
proposals are not of a piece, and their differences reveal the fault lines
of professionalism in intriguing ways. One type of proposal emphasizes
the distinction between expert professionalism and social trustee
professionalism and proposes an amicable divorce. After questioning
the bar’s commitment to “a single profession of law,”395 legal scholar
Gillian K. Hadfield explicitly rejects the idea that all attorneys should be
dedicated to protecting and upholding the foundations of American
democracy.396 In her view, the legal system serves two very different
functions: the safeguarding of political and democratic institutions on
the one hand and the promotion of efficient market transactions on the
other.397 These functions should be disaggregated so that differentiated
legal professions can evolve.398 In particular, she argues that the publicregarding aspects of law unduly interfere with efficient operation of the
private market.399 Hadfield proposes that “[t]he financial interests of
lawyers should be reined in where access to legal services is necessary
to protect democratic interests rooted in our normative goals of equality,
dignity, fairness, and individual wellbeing. . . .”400 However, “where the
interests at stake are the profit-making endeavors of entities, our primary
concern in the design of regulation should be the efficiency of legal
391. Id. at 1270.
392. Id. at 1272-74.
393. Id. at 1274-75.
394. Id. at 1276.
395. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (2008).
This commitment is set forth in ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Resolution of
House
of
Delegates
Adopting
Revised
Recommendation
10F
(2000),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdprecom10f.html.
396. Hadfield, supra note 395, at 1705-06.
397. Id. at 1702.
398. Id. at 1704-05.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1730.
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markets and their capacity to promote the efficiency of other markets.”401
In Hadfield’s bifurcated account of law practice, expert professionalism
dominates the market, while public values at the heart of social
trusteeship become part of an amorphous catchall of norms beyond the
scope of efficient exchange.402
Hadfield’s proposal speaks directly to Kronman and MacCrate’s
anxieties about the perils to social trusteeship that market restructuring
poses, and it seems likely to bring little comfort to those who see publicregarding obligations as inhering in legal professionalism, regardless of
practice sector. Her notion of bifurcation stands in marked contrast to
that of law professor Brian Tamanaha. He too has questioned the unified
nature of the bar, this time by assailing the homogeneity of legal
education—enforced through the accreditation process and entrenched
by law school rankings.403 Much as Alfred Z. Reed proposed to
differentiate among law schools, 404 Tamanaha has recommended
creation of a two-track system with elite institutions offering traditional
academic programs of instruction while other law schools provide
affordable, practice-oriented training.405 He argues that “[t]he legal
profession has never been unitary in the nature of the work done by
lawyers or in their compensation.”406 So, “[a] law graduate who wishes
to engage in a local practice need not acquire, or pay for, the same
education as a graduate aiming for corporate legal practice.”407
Tamanaha believes that lower-cost degrees could promote access to the
profession among the middle class and poor, and restructuring legal
education could enhance opportunities to serve clients who currently
lack access to legal services.408
In a 2014 report, the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal
Education recognizes the same divide as Tamanaha does. The Task
Force acknowledges that “[i]t matters greatly whether . . . one takes a
view of lawyers as primarily deliverers of technical services requiring a
certain skill or expertise, or as persons who are broad-based problem

401. Id. Elsewhere, Hadfield describes how we should facilitate efficient legal markets
through various forms of competition. See GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT
WORLD 219-45 (2017).
402. Hadfield, supra note 395, at 1730.
403. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 174.
404. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
405. See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 174.
406. Id. at 27.
407. Id. at 174. Like Reed, Tamanaha acknowledges that different programs of instruction
are likely to track class privilege, but he believes that elite law schools already attract a
disproportionately wealthy student body. Id. at 102.
408. Id. at 27, 175.
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solvers and societal leaders.”409 The Task Force equates “[t]he
traditional emphasis on legal education as delivering public value” with
“a focus on quality of legal education as an overriding goal by law
schools.”410
By contrast, “the new emphasis on consumer
considerations—and more broadly on legal education as a private
good—has had the opposite tendency,” with a push to drive down
prices.411 Though purporting to strike a middle ground, the Commission
emphatically concludes that “law schools are in the business of
delivering legal education services.”412 Unsurprisingly, with this
commercial orientation, the report focuses almost entirely on inculcating
technical competencies in the most cost-effective way.413
A natural outgrowth of the proposal to offer two-tiered law degrees
is the push to certify the legal competencies of non-lawyers.414
According to a 2013 Hanover Research report, approximately twenty
law schools had degrees of this kind, 415 and the programs now are
common enough to merit a list on the ABA Section of Legal Education’s
website.416 Some commentators have expressed doubts about the value
of the credentials, which remain largely unregulated and untested
commodities.417 As skeptic Kyle McEntee, Executive Director of Law
School Transparency, observes, non-J.D. programs may simply be
409. ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, Report and Recommendations
14 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/rep
ort_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf.
410. Id. at 25.
411. Id.
412. Id. (emphasis in original).
413. Id. at 22-23, 25.
414. ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, supra note 409, at 24-25; Jennifer
Smith and Ashby Jones, More Often Non-Lawyers Try a Taste of Law School, WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 2013; Avi Wolfman-Arent, New Paper Chase: Law School for Non-Lawyers,
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 15, 2016, 3:48 PM),
http://www.marketplace.org/2016/07/15/education/law-schools-offering-programs-nonlawyers; Karen Sloan, Northwestern’s New Masters Program Targets Non-Lawyers, NAT’L
L.J. (Nov. 14, 2013).
415. Hanover Research, Alternative Non-JD Programming for Law Schools 27-29 (June
2013), http://hanoverresearch.com/media/Alternative-Non-JD-Programming-for-LawSchools1.pdf.
416. ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Resources-Post J.D.
and Non-J.D. Programs, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/llmdegrees_post_j_d_non_j_d.html. There have been similar developments in other areas of
professional education. See generally Susan Bedner et al., Educational Preparation of Nurse
Practitioners and Physician Assistants: An Exploratory Review, 29 ADVANCED EMERGENCY
NURSING J. 158, 165-67 (2007). Some have questioned the utility and efficiency of costly
licensing requirements for non-physician clinicians. Shirley Svorney, Medical Licensing: An
Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care, MED. BENEFITS, Sept. 17, 2008, at 6-7.
417. Wolfman-Arent, supra note 414; Smith and Jones, supra note 414; Sloan, supra note
414; Eli Mystal, Law Schools Target New Students to Fleece, Above the Law (May 20, 2013,
2:27 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/05/law-schools-target-new-students-to-fleece/.
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offered “as a cash grab—not because people actually need them.”418
Whatever the actual value, these degrees are a concession to the
declining professional monopoly on legal expertise.
The notion of bifurcation in the legal academy is strikingly different
from Hadfield’s account of the split in the legal profession. Creating
two tracks of law schools reconstructs expert professionalism by
establishing tiers of mastery that have little or nothing to do with social
trusteeship. In the three prior ages of modern American lawyering, the
most intense contests focused on the scope of lawyers’ public
obligations—whether to protect the integrity of the legal process, to
serve the public in government positions, or to challenge societal
injustice through litigation and other forms of advocacy. Each
innovation in lawyering expanded the landscape of practice, creating
new ways for lawyers to apply their expertise but also new ways to serve
the public at large. In an era of contraction, Tamanaha’s proposal alerts
us that a fourth age of modern American lawyering may openly contest
the previously uncontroversial notion of expert professionalism as a
unifying feature of lawyers’ identity. No longer will it be possible to
assume that a shared level of expertise is a sine qua non for the delivery
of legal services. As a result, expert professionalism itself will be
destabilized, further complicating debates about how public-regarding
obligations grow out of the privileges that come with the technical
mastery of law.
C. The Way Forward: Deepening Our Understanding of the Symbiotic
Relationship Between Social Trustee and Expert Professionalism
To address claims that the current crisis will undo conventional
notions of professionalism, lawyers and legal educators must remember
to look not only at Kronman’s and MacCrate’s concerns that social
trusteeship will be displaced by market forces but also the real possibility
that expertise will be unbundled in ways that are themselves deprofessionalizing. In considering whether these dangers are imminent,
the practicing bar and legal educators should work together to identify
the changing parameters of expert professionalism as well as the
pressures on social trustee professionalism.
A more nuanced
understanding of lawyers’ everyday lives can illuminate the complex
and symbiotic ways in which social trustee and expert professionalism
contribute to workplace identities. That deepened appreciation in turn
can offer insights into the resiliency of professionalism as practice
environments are transformed.

418. Wolfman-Arent, supra note 414.
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With respect to expert professionalism, the organized bar should
partner with law professors and empirical scholars to evaluate which
skills have been critical to lawyers’ success, which new skills may be
emerging that affect success, and which skills are most likely to be
commoditized and hence become less relevant to success. Professors
Marjorie M. Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck have done important work that
bears on these questions.419 Their research draws on interviews with
alumni of Berkeley Law School, clients, faculty, students, and judges as
well as focus groups and an online survey of alumni to assess factors
important to lawyer effectiveness.420 Interestingly, Shultz and Zedeck
have identified a number of relevant factors that are independent of
conventional measures of cognitive ability, such as grade point averages
and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores.421 These factors relate
to personality traits like optimism, ambition, and stress management,
interpersonal sensitivity, and the capacity for situated judgment.422
According to Shultz and Zedeck, these non-cognitive factors often prove
to be more highly correlated with lawyer performance than academic
measures. 423 A later study by Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers has
confirmed these findings.424 Drawing on a nation-wide survey of over
24,000 attorneys who work in a wide range of settings, Alli Gerkman
and Logan Cornett report that along with intellectual aptitude and legal
skills, young lawyers must display emotional intelligence, an ability to
communicate effectively, as well as character traits that demonstrate
honesty, integrity, and reliability.425 Gerkman and Cornett conclude
that:
419. Marjorie M. Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness:
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620
(2011).
420. Id. at 629-31.
421. Id. at 643-47.
422. Id. at 643-47.
423. Id. at 654. Based on interviews and surveys of associates at large law firms, Lori
Berman, Heather Bock, and Juliet Aiken also found that non-cognitive factors played an
important role in their sense of flourishing and their success in making partner. LORI
BERMAN, HEATHER BOCK, & JULIET AIKEN, ACCELERATING LAWYER SUCCESS 98-99
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Intelligence, on its own, is not enough. Technical legal skills are not
enough. [Attorneys] require a broader set of characteristics (or, the
character quotient), professional competencies, and legal skills that,
when taken together, produce a whole lawyer. When we value any
one foundation, like intelligence, and when we value any one group
of foundations, like legal skills, we shortchange not only the
potential of that lawyer—we also shortchange the clients who rely
on them.426

According to this research, accounts of expert professionalism that
focus narrowly on substantive knowledge and technical skills
significantly understate the complexity of what it takes to be an effective
lawyer.427 Non-cognitive factors enable lawyers to better assess the
contexts in which legal problems arise and to make superior situated
judgments for their clients. These abilities transcend any particular
transaction. For example, the capacity to cultivate relationships with
colleagues and clients along with the ability to develop strategic plans
for large-scale undertakings can be critical to preserving a law firm’s
health. Partners can recognize and reward these talents, for example, by
using firm citizenship as well as origination of new business and number
of billable hours to set compensation.428
As for emerging skills that are increasingly relevant to success,
some preliminary research bears on this question. In a study of large law
firm partners done after the 2008 recession, researchers Milton Regan
and Lisa Rohrer found that entrepreneurial skills have grown in
significance in determining partner compensation, mobility, and job
security.429 As one partner explains, “You need to be a good technical
lawyer, but that is sort of table stakes not to get fired.”430 With respect
to bringing in new clients, lawyers must be able to make themselves
known through networking, make successful pitches for business, and
maintain relationships.431 But just as importantly, for the majority of
attorneys who cannot expect to be rainmakers, there is a need for internal
marketing to ensure that other partners refer matters to them.432 As one
lawyer explained, this means “getting to know partners, trying to get
opportunities to work with them, and getting your name around to
partners in other offices.”433 Even if self-promotion has always figured
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Id.
Id. at 33.

518

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

in growing a law practice, the economic downturn in 2008 intensified
these pressures, leading one partner to muse that:
What I didn’t realize was how much of a business the practice of law
is. I spend a very significant part of my time just managing the
practice and managing my relationship with the law firm and
managing my relationship with my clients. And I spend a very
significant portion of my time worrying about business development
. . . . I am my own sales force. I am my own marketing force. I also
have to service all my clients at the same time and I am effectively
my own billing department . . . . So you find yourself a small
business within a law firm, and I had no idea that I would be running,
literally running, a small business in a law firm. 434

What the Regan and Rohrer study suggests, then, is that the rigors
of the market are forcing attorneys to hone their entrepreneurial skills,
but these capacities supplement rather than supplant the traditional ones
that have made for a successful lawyer.
As for which skills are apt to be more or less durable in the face of
commoditization, Richard Susskind’s work offers some guideposts.435
He describes how bespoke work that is “traditional, hand-crafted, oneto-one consultative professional service, highly tailored for the specific
needs of particular clients” becomes commoditized.436 When legal tasks
are done on a recurring basis, bespoke work grows increasingly
standardized. This routinization takes place, even if the service is still
“delivered in a highly personalized manner, with regular, direct contact
between the lawyer and the client.”437 Once standardization occurs, the
legal service can be systematized through automation; initially, these
technologies will be for internal use only.438 Later, this internal system
is made directly accessible to clients through packaging of the legal
services, thus permitting non-lawyers to learn about pressing legal
concerns.439 The final stage in this evolutionary process occurs with
commoditization, when packages of legal services are “very readily
available in the market, often from a variety of sources, and certainly at
highly competitive prices.”440
As Susskind notes, lawyers fear that legal practice will be less
prestigious and less remunerative if “high quality service, charged at a
reasonable price and subject to regular update and maintenance, can be
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delivered in standardized, systematized, and packaged form.”441 These
anxieties clearly figure in concerns that there is a crisis in the legal
profession and legal education. Yet, examples of commoditization
mainly focus on how certain fields of knowledge cease to be novel and
become mundane. There is no discussion of practice conditions that
generate innovation and replenish the realm of bespoke practice even as
commoditization is occurring in other areas. For example, innovation
may turn on collaboration that enables lawyers to think outside the box
about their practices. While the process of nurturing creativity
undoubtedly implicates cognitive capacities, it also may depend on noncognitive talents that enhance collegial exchange and deepen client
relationships. Skills related to communication and facilitation can
enable lawyers to appreciate how practice contexts are changing and to
convene the teams that will address those changes effectively. Then,
entrepreneurial abilities can help to alert clients to the next big thing in
bespoke practice. This broader understanding of professional expertise
affords some comfort in the face of commoditization. By moving
beyond a focus on technical knowledge, lawyers can consider how to
develop practices that identify and capitalize on emerging opportunities
as the market for legal services shifts.
Similar efforts are needed to address fears that intensifying
pressures to focus on the bottom line will eclipse social trusteeship.
Most of these concerns relate to the profit motive crowding out a sense
of public obligation at large law firms.442 Returning to the Regan and
Rohrer study, their interviews reveal that partners at major firms are
struggling to reconcile market forces with professional values.443 Law
firm culture—especially as expressed through the compensation
process—expresses these dual commitments. While some firms may
have an “eat what you kill” model that treats law like a business, most
firms encourage a more balanced approach by recognizing contributions
to the wellbeing of the firm as well to the good of society. For example,
compensation committees recognize cooperative behavior as a way to
signal that collegiality is a core value at the firm.444 In addition,
committees count pro bono work as a contribution to the firm’s
collective commitments.445 Through these compensation decisions,
firms acknowledge that “many lawyers value the opportunity to be of

441. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 374, at 32.
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service to clients, to work in a collegial atmosphere, to do high-quality
work, to participate in work that is intrinsically meaningful, and to be of
some service to society.”446 As Regan and Rohrer conclude, “[n]ot all
firms will necessarily attempt to give meaningful weight to professional
values. Furthermore, even those that do will not necessarily succeed in
striking a credible balance. Our research suggests, however, that it
matters to many partners that their firms make the effort to do so.”447
Regan and Rohrer’s study suggests that partners are not yet ready
to ballast professionalism and enter a fourth age of modern American
lawyering. But to fully answer questions about the future of the legal
profession and legal education, additional work is needed. A high
proportion of the research done so far has focused on the large law firm.
Although major firms are important opinion leaders in the profession, it
is critical to consider the portfolio of skills that make for effective
lawyers in other practice settings, including solo and small law firms, inhouse counsel departments, government agencies, and public interest
organizations. Without a broader inquiry, lawyers and legal educators
can only speculate about how notions of expert professionalism are
changing outside the corporate law firm.
For similar reasons, there should be additional study of how
lawyers in government and public interest define social trusteeship. As
law professor Ann Southworth has noted, “[w]orkplaces and practice
specialties play an important role in ‘lawyer socialization’ and the ‘dayto-day interpretation of professional standards.’ ” 448 Moreover, the
professional ideals generated in different practice settings vary based on
“lawyers’ economic, power, and status goals.”449 An unduly narrow
focus on large law firms or an unduly broad emphasis on the profession
as a whole can obscure the “ethical pluralism” that informs the meaning
of social trusteeship in a range of practice environments.450 An
acknowledgment of these diverse commitments could reveal the limits
of a polarized, binary rhetoric that pits market forces against public
obligation. In fact, one source of social trusteeship’s ongoing influence
may be its capacity for adaptation to new practice settings. As the field
of law changes, trusteeship can evolve to take account of new ways to
serve the greater good while accommodating the unique features of
distinct sectors of the profession. In a field traditionally united by
common technical competencies, expertise serves as an important source
of shared professional identity. Yet, the capacity for differentiation in a
446.
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range of practice environments may be a critical source of resilience and
relevancy for social trusteeship.
To undertake inquiries like these, it will be important for leaders in
the bar and legal education to join forces. In this spirit, Ben W.
Heineman, Jr., William F. Lee, and David B. Wilkins have made the case
for elite law schools, large law firms, and in-house counsel at major
corporations to work cooperatively in thinking about lawyers’
professional identity. 451 Although most people identify lawyers as
technical experts, Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins contend that attorneys
also have to be wise counselors who consider not only what the law is
but what it might become.452 These counselors should evaluate both the
course of action that is legally permitted and the one that is right in light
of a particular client’s goals. To serve as a wise counselor, lawyers must
have the capacity for situated judgment, the ability to facilitate exchange
among multiple stakeholders, and the skill to seek out and listen to nonlawyers with unique insights into a client’s aims and culture.453 In
addition, many lawyers will assume positions of leadership, and in these
roles, they also will need to be able to make decisions, manage
organizations and situations, and hew to ethical precepts.454
Although Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins emphasize elite sectors of
practice, all law schools can partner with attorneys in different practice
sectors to consider the skills needed for successful law practice. By
undertaking such efforts, legal educators will be heeding the call of the
Carnegie report on “Educating Lawyers,” which urged law schools to
address three apprenticeships: the first emphasizing legal analysis or
thinking like a lawyer; the second addressing the practical skills of
lawyering; and the third dealing with the role of the lawyer in the larger
society.455 The Carnegie report concludes that schools do an excellent
job with the first apprenticeship, which enables students to master the
doctrinal intricacies of the law.456 And, law schools are doing a better
job at preparing students for the practice of law through expanded
experiential learning courses.457 Yet, schools continue to lag in
addressing the third apprenticeship. In particular, they fail to afford
students enough “opportunities to learn about, reflect on, and practice
the responsibilities of legal professionals. Despite progress in making
451. BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., WILLIAM F. LEE, & DAVID B. WILKINS, LAWYERS AS
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CENTURY (2014).
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legal ethics a part of the curriculum, law schools rarely pay consistent
attention to the social and cultural contexts of legal institutions and to
the varied forms of legal practice.”458 Pursuing inquiries into the
changing nature of the skills needed for successful practice could enable
schools to refine their experiential learning programs and to explore
social trusteeship in different practice settings. This work should enable
law school faculty, alumni, and students alike to reflect on their unique
professional obligations as lawyers. Students in particular could
participate in the research as a way to promote a deeper understanding
of expert and social trustee professionalism as they prepare to lead the
field of law into its uncertain but dynamic future.
CONCLUSION
It is too early to conclude that a crisis in the legal profession and
legal education is redefining modern American lawyering as we know
it. But efforts to refine our understanding of the knowledge, skills, and
social responsibilities that define successful law practice are long
overdue. Too often, today’s accounts of lawyering create a sharp
dichotomy between “law as a business” and “law as a profession,”
pitting expert and social trustee professionalism against one another. In
fact, available research offers a far more nuanced picture in which both
forms of professionalism figure in attorneys’ sense of their status and
satisfaction. Rather than dispense altogether with the language of
professionalism, we must interrogate the concept more carefully. Only
in that way can we navigate challenging times with a compass that is true
to our past and open to our future.
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